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Abstract
Hypothesis tests are a crucial statistical tool for data
mining and are the workhorse of scientific research in
many fields. Here we study differentially private tests
of independence between a categorical and a contin-
uous variable. We take as our starting point tradi-
tional nonparametric tests, which require no distribu-
tional assumption (e.g., normality) about the data dis-
tribution. We present private analogues of the Kruskal-
Wallis, Mann-Whitney, and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests,
as well as the parametric one-sample t-test. These tests
use novel test statistics developed specifically for the pri-
vate setting. We compare our tests to prior work, both
on parametric and nonparametric tests. We find that in
all cases our new nonparametric tests achieve large im-
provements in statistical power, even when the assump-
tions of parametric tests are met.
1 Introduction
In 2011, researchers in Switzerland began an investiga-
tion into the link between methylation levels of a given
gene and the occurance of schizophrenia and bipolar dis-
order [6]. They recruited patients that suffered from
psychosis as well as healthy controls and measured the
level of methylation of the gene in each individual. They
found that levels in the groups suffering from psychosis
were higher than those in the healthy group. In order
to rule out the possibility that this difference was due
to sampling variability, they relied upon a suite of non-
parameteric hypothesis tests to establish that this link
likely exists in the general population.
While the results of these tests were published in an
academic journal, the data itself is unavailable to pre-
serve the privacy of the patients. This is a necessary
consideration when working with sensitive data, but it
hampers scientific reproducibility and the extension of
this work by other researchers.
Our goal in this paper is to provide nonparametric hy-
pothesis tests that satisfy differential privacy. The dif-
ficulty of developing a private test comes not just from
the need to privately approximate a test statistic, but
also from the need for an accurate reference distribution
that will produce valid p-values. It is not sufficient to
treat the approximate test statistic as equivalent to its
non-private counterpart.
In this paper, we present several new hypothesis tests.
In all cases we are considering data sets with a cat-
egorical explanatory variable (e.g., membership in the
schizophrenic, bipolar, or control group) and a contin-
uous dependent variable (e.g., methylation level). Our
goal when designing a hypothesis test is to maximize the
statistical power of the test, or equivalently to minimize
the amount of data needed to detect a particular effect.
In the traditional public setting, there are two fam-
ilies of tests for these scenarios. The more commonly
used are parametric tests that assume that within each
group, the continuous variable follows a particular distri-
bution (usually Gaussian). An alternative to these tests
are nonparametric tests, which make no distributional
assumption but, in exchange, have slightly lower power.
Nonparametric tests generally rely upon substituting in,
for each data point, the rank of the continuous variable
relative to the rest of the sample. The test statistic is
then a function of these ranks rather than the original
values.
The private hypothesis tests we propose all use rank-
based test statistics. Our overarching argument in this
paper, beyond the individual value of each of the tests
we introduce, is that in the private setting these rank-
based test statistics are more powerful than the tradi-
tional parametric alternatives. This is contrary to the
public setting, where the parametric tests (when their
assumptions are met) perform better.
Our second, broader point is that as a research com-
munity we need to support the development of hypoth-
esis tests specifically tailored to the private setting. Our
private test statistics are not simply approximations of
traditional test statistics from the public setting and as
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a result, we find that they can require an order of mag-
nitude less data. Current tests used by statisticians in
the public setting have been refined through decades of
incremental improvement, and the same sort of develop-
ment needs to happen in the private setting.
1.1 Our contributions
We introduce several new private hypothesis tests that
mirror the three most commonly used rank-based tests.
In one setting, this is a private analog of the traditional
public test statistic, but for the remaining two settings
it is a new statistic developed specifically for the private
setting. The privacy of these statistics generally follows
from non-trivial but reasonably straightforward applica-
tions of the Laplace mechanism. Our main contribution
is not the method of achieving privacy but the construc-
tion of novel private hypothesis tests with high statistical
power.
There are two components to the construction of each
hypothesis test. The first is the creation of a test statistic
to capture the effect of interest while remaining provably
private. The second is a method to learn the distribution
of the statistic under the null hypothesis in order to com-
pute p-values, which are the object of primary interest
to researchers.
In particular, we develop tests for the following cases:
Three or more groups When the categorical vari-
able divides the sample into three or more groups, the
traditional public test is the one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) in the parametric case and Kruskal-Wallace
in the nonparametric case. ANOVA has been previously
studied by Campbell et al. [5] and then by Swanberg et
al. [31], who improved the power by an order of mag-
nitude. We give the first private nonparametric test by
modifying the rank-based Kruskal-Wallace test statistic
for the private setting. We provide experimental evi-
dence that this statistic has dramatically higher power
than a simple privatized version of the public Kruskal-
Wallace statistic. Moreover, we provide evidence that
even in the parametric setting (i.e., when the data is nor-
mally distributed) the private rank-based statistic out-
performs the private ANOVA test, in one representative
case requiring only 23% as much data to reach the same
power.
Two groups In the two group setting, the most com-
mon public nonparametric test is the Mann-Whitney
test. We provide an algorithm to release an approxi-
mation of this statistic under differential privacy and a
second algorithm to conduct the test and release a valid
p-value.
In the public setting, the analogous parametric test is
the two sample t-test which is equivalent to an ANOVA
test when there are two groups. We compare therefore to
the private ANOVA test and show experimental evidence
that our Mann-Whitney analog has significantly higher
power.
Paired data We also consider the case where the
two sets of data are in correspondence with each other
(e.g., before-and-after measurements). The nonparamet-
ric test in this case is the Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
and it is the only nonparametric test that has previously
been studied in the private setting [33]. We provide two
improvements to the prior work. First, we change the
underlying statistic to the less well-known Pratt variant,
which we find conforms more easily to the addition of
noise. Second, we show that our simulation method for
computing reference distributions is more precise than
the upper bounds used in the prior work (which con-
tained an error which we identify and correct). The re-
sult is a significant improvement in the power of the test
over the the prior work.
In parallel with the previous two scenarios, we then
compare our private nonparametric test with a private
version of the analogous parametric test, the paired t-
test. A direct private implementation of this test does
not exist in the literature, so we propose one here.1 In
alignment with the previous results, we show experimen-
tal evidence that the rank-based test has superior power.
For all our tests we give not just private test statistics
but also precise methods of computing a reference dis-
tribution and a p-value, the final output practitioners
actually need. We also experimentally verify that the
probability of Type 1 errors (incorrectly rejecting the
null hypothesis) is acceptably low. We give careful power
analyses and use these to compare tests to each other.
All our tests and experiments are implemented with pub-
licly available code.2
We find that rank-based statistics are very amenable
to the private setting. We also repeatedly find that what
is optimal in the public setting is no longer optimal in the
private setting. We hope that this work contributes to
the development of a standard set of powerful hypothesis
tests that can be used by scientists to enable inferential
analysis while protecting privacy.
2 Background
In this section, we begin by discussing hypothesis testing
in general and outlining the formalities of differential pri-
vacy. We then discuss the difficulties of hypothesis test-
ing within the privacy framework and the previous work
done in this area. Each of our main results requires a
more detailed discussion of prior work on that particular
1In simultaneous work Gaboardi et al. [15] propose such a test,
but our test is still higher power. See Section 5.5 for more details.
2Our source code is available at: github.com/simonpcouch/non-
pm-dpht
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test or use case; we leave those discussions for Sections
3-5.
2.1 Hypothesis Testing
The key inferential leap that is made in hypothesis test-
ing is the claim that not only is the sample of data in-
compatible with a particular scientific theory, but that
it is evidence that this incompatible holds in a broader
population. In the study on psychotic disease, the re-
searchers used this technique to generalize from their 165
subjects to the population of causasian-descended Swiss.
The scientific theory that they refuted, that there is no
link between methylation levels and psychosis, is called
the null hypothesis (H0).
To test whether or not the data is consistent with H0, a
researcher computes a test statistic. The choice of a func-
tion f to compute the test statistic largely determines
the hypothesis test being used. For a random database
X drawn according to H0, the distribution of the statis-
tic T = f(X) can be determined either analytically or
through simulation. The researcher then computes a p-
value, the probability that the observed test statistic or
more extreme would occur under H0.
Definition 2.1. For a given test statistic t = f(x) and
null hypothesis H0, the p-value is defined as
Pr[T ≥ t | T = f(X) and X← H0] = p.
If the function f is well-chosen, then the more the un-
derlying distribution of X differs from the distribution
under H0, the more likely a low p-value becomes. Typi-
cally a threshold value α is chosen, such that we reject H0
as a plausible explanation of the data when p < α. The
choice of α determines the type I error rate, the proba-
bility of incorrectly rejecting a true null hypothesis.
We define the critical value t∗ to be the value of the
test statistic t where p = α. We use this to define the
statistical power, a measure of how likely a hypothesis
test is to pick up on a given effect (i.e. the chance of
rejecting when the null hypothesis is false). The power
is a function of how much the underlying distribution of
X differs from the distribution under H0 as well as the
size of the database.
Definition 2.2. For a given alternate data distribution
HA, the statistical power of a hypothesis test is
Pr[T ≥ t∗ | T = f(X) and X← HA].
Statistical power is the accepted metric by which the
statistics community judges the usefulness of a hypoth-
esis test. It provides a common scale upon which to
evaluate different tests for the same use case.
2.2 Differential Privacy
To persuade people to allow their personal data to
be collected, data owners must protect information
about specific individuals. Historically, ad-hoc database
anonymization techniques have been used (i.e. changing
names to numeric IDs, rounding geospatial coordinates
to the nearest block, etc.), but these methods have re-
peatedly been shown to be ineffective [17,22,32].
Differential privacy, proposed by Dwork et al. in
2006 [11], is a mathematically robust definition of pri-
vacy preservation, which guarantees that a query does
not reveal anything about an individual as a consequence
of their presence in the database. When the condition
of differential privacy is satisfied, there is not much dif-
ference between the output obtained from the original
database, and that obtained from a database that differs
by only one individual’s data. Here we present (, δ)-
differential privacy [10], which allows the closeness of
output distributions to be measured with both a mul-
tiplicative and an additive factor. However, for most of
our hypothesis tests δ = 0.
Definition 2.3 (Differential Privacy). A randomized al-
gorithm f˜ on databases is (, δ)-differentially private if for
all S ⊆ Range(f˜) and for databases x,x′ that only differ
in one row:
Pr[f˜(x) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[f˜(x′) ∈ S] + δ.
We call databases x and x′ neighboring if they differ
only in that a single row is altered (but not added or
deleted), and we will use this notation in the following
sections.3
Differential privacy, like any acceptable privacy defini-
tion, is resistant to post processing. That is, if an algo-
rithm is differentially private, an adversary with no ac-
cess to the database will be unable to violate such privacy
through further analysis (e.g., attempted deanonymiza-
tion) of the query output [11].
Theorem 2.4 (Post Processing). Let f˜ be an (, δ)-
differentially private randomized algorithm. Let g be an
arbitrary randomized algorithm. Then g ◦ f˜ is (, δ)- dif-
ferentially private.
Theorem 2.4 has another useful consequence. It allows
us to develop private algorithms by first computing some
private output, and then carrying out further computa-
tion on that output without accessing the database. The
additional computation need not be analyzed carefully—
the final output of the additional analysis is automati-
cally known to retain privacy.
Differential privacy requires the introduction of some
randomness to any query output. A frequently used
method is the Laplace mechanism, introduced by Dwork
et al. [11]. When given an arbitrary algorithm f with
real-valued output, this mechanism will add some noise
drawn from the Laplace distribution to the output of the
algorithm and release a noisy output.
3This is one of two roughly equivalent variants of differential
privacy. The key difference is that under this definition the size of
the database is public knowledge.
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Definition 2.5 (Laplace Distribution). The Laplace
Distribution centered at 0 with scale b is the distribu-
tion with probability density function:
Lap(x|b) = 1
2b
exp
(
− |x|
b
)
.
We write Lap(b) to denote the Laplace distribution with
scale b.
The scale of the Laplace Distribution used to produce
the noisy output depends on the global sensitivity of the
given algorithm f , which is the maximum change on the
output of f that could result from the alteration of a
single row.
Definition 2.6 (Global sensitivity). The global sensi-
tivity of a function f is:
GSf = max
x,x′
|f(x)− f(x′)|,
where x and x′ are neighbouring databases.
With computed sensitivity GSf and privacy parame-
ter , the Laplace mechanism applied to f ensures (, 0)-
differential privacy [11].
Definition 2.7 (Laplace Mechanism). Given any func-
tion f , the Laplace mechanism is defined as:
f˜(x) = f(x) + Y,
where Y is drawn from Lap(GSf/), and GSf is the global
sensitivity of f .
Theorem 2.8. (Laplace Mechanism) The Laplace mech-
anism preserves (, 0) differential privacy.
Global sensitivity is the maximum effect that can be
caused by changing a single row of any database. Some-
times it is helpful to talk about local sensitivity for
a given database x [24]. This is the maximum effect
that can be caused by changing a row of that particular
database.
Definition 2.9 (Local Sensitivity). The sensitivity of a
function f at a particular database x is:
LSf (x) = max
x′
|f(x)− f(x′)|,
where x′ is a neighboring database.
Note that GSf = maxx LSf (x). Local sensitivity can-
not simply be used in the Laplace mechanism in place
of global sensitivity, because local sensitivity itself is a
function of the database and therefore cannot be re-
leased. But private upper bounds on local sensitivity
can be used to create similar mechanisms that do pre-
serve privacy, and one of our algorithms uses just such a
technique.
Choosing  is an important consideration when us-
ing differential privacy. We consider several values of
 throughout our power analyses. The lowest, .01 is an
extremely conservative privacy parameter and allows for
safe composition with many other queries of compara-
ble  value. We also use s of .1 and 1, which, while
higher, still provide very meaningful privacy protection.
Ultimately, the choice of  is a question of policy and de-
pends on the relative importance with which privacy and
utility are regarded. We also measure, for comparison,
the power of the public versions of each test (equivalent
to an  of ∞). As one might expect, the amount of data
needed to detect a given effect often scales roughly with
the inverse of .
2.3 Differentially Private Hypothesis
Testing
Performing hypothesis tests within the framework of dif-
ferential privacy introduces new complexity. A function
to compute a private test statistic (be it a private ver-
sion of a standard test statistic or an entirely new test
statistic) is not useful on its own. We need a p-value
or other understandable output, and that means under-
standing the reference distribution (i.e., the distribution
of the statistic given H0).
In classical statistics, test statistics are computed with
deterministic functions. The randomness added to the
test statistic in order to privatize it introduces new com-
plexity. Most importantly, it causes the reference dis-
tribution to change. One cannot simply compare the
private test statistic to the usual reference distribution,
as the addition of noise can inflate the type I error well
above acceptable levels [5].
Because of this, a complete differentially private hy-
pothesis test requires not only a function for computing
a private test statistic, but also a method for determining
its null distribution. Often the exact reference distribu-
tion cannot be determined, so worst-case reference dis-
tributions or upper bounds on the resulting critical value
must be used, and the precision of this reference distri-
bution can have a large effect on the resulting power.
The goal of differentially private hypothesis test design
is to develop a test with power as close as possible to the
public test.
2.4 Related Work
There is a substantial and growing literature on differen-
tially private hypothesis testing. One area of research is
the study of the rate of convergence of private statistics
to the distributions of their public analogues [28,29,37].
These papers do not offer practical, implementable tests
and discussion of reference distributions when the noise
is not yet negligible is often limited or entirely absent.
Further, the results are often entirely asymptotic, with-
4
out regard for constants that may prove to be problem-
atic.
The chi-squared test, which tests the independence of
two categorical variables,4 has been the subject of much
study, resulting in the development of many private vari-
ants. One of these works, that of Vu and Slavkovic [35],
provides methods for calculation of accurate p-values ad-
justed for the addition of Laplace noise for differentially
private single proportion and chi-squared tests specifi-
cally for clinical trial data. Several other papers, though
they make asymptotic arguments on the uniformity of
their p-values, have developed frameworks for private
chi-squared tests specifically for the intent of genome-
wide association study (GWAS) data [13, 18, 34]. For
these same tests, Monte Carlo simulation has been shown
to offer more precise analysis in some cases [14,36]. There
has also been work, like that of Rogers and Kifer [26],
that proposes entirely new test statistics with asymptotic
distributions more similar to their public counterparts.
While the development of private test statistics has
achieved much attention, careful evaluations of statis-
tical power of these new test statistics is not always
demonstrated. This is unfortunate, as the cost of pri-
vacy (utility loss) must be accurately quantified in order
for the widespread adoption or implementation of any
of these methods. Fortunately, rigorous power analy-
sis seems to be more common in recent work. Awan
and Slavkovic recently presented a test for simple bino-
mial data [2]. While the setting is the simplest possible,
their paper gives what we believe is the first private test
to come with a proof of optimality, something normally
very difficult to achieve even in the public setting.
The body of work on numerical (rather than cate-
gorical) methods is less extensive but has been grow-
ing quickly in recent years. In 2017, Nguyen and Hui
proposed algorithms for survival analysis methods [23].
There have been frameworks developed for testing the
difference in means of normal distributions [8, 9], and
for testing whether a sample is consistent with a normal
distribution with a particular mean [30]. Differentially
private versions of linear regressions, a class of inference
that is extremely common in many fields both within
and outside of academia, have received a notable level
of attention, but the treatment of regression coefficients
as test statistics has come about only recently [3, 27].
Two works have studied differentially private versions of
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) [5,31]. The only
prior work done on nonparametric hypothesis tests, as
far as we are aware, is on the Wilcoxon signed-rank test
by Task and Clifton in 2016 [33]. Prior work specifically
relevant to the tests we are proposing will be discussed
in more detail in the relevant section.
4This is the chi-squared test of independence. There are several
related tests that use the same statistic, the chi-squared.
3 Many groups
We first consider the most general case, where we wish
to distinguish whether many groups share the same dis-
tribution on a continuous variable. The standard para-
metric test in the public setting is the one-way analysis
of variance (ANOVA), which tests the equality of means
across many groups. Private ANOVA has been studied
previously first by Campbell et al. [5] and then by Swan-
berg et al. [31], who improved the power by an order of
magnitude. The standard nonparametric test in the pub-
lic setting is the Kruskal-Wallis test, which was used by
the pschosis research group to determine that subjects in
the schizophrenia, bipolar, and control groups had dif-
ferent methylation levels at a particular gene site [6]. As
is standard for nonparametric statistics in the public set-
ting, it sacrifices some power compared to ANOVA but
no longer assumes normally distributed data. [12]
In this section we present two tests. The first is a
straightforward privatization of the standard Kruskal-
Wallis test statistic. The second modifies the statistic,
essentially by linearizing the implied distance metric. We
find first that our modified statistic has much higher
power. We then further show that our modified statistic
has much higher power than the ANOVA test of Swan-
berg et al. even when the data is normally distributed.
3.1 The Kruskal-Wallis test
The Kruskal-Wallis test, proposed by William Kruskal
and W. Allen Wallis in 1952 [20], is used to determine if
several groups share the same distribution in a continu-
ous variable. The only assumptions are that the data are
drawn randomly and independently from a distribution
with at least an ordinal scale.
Take a database x with g groups5 and n rows. Let
ni be the size of each group and rij be the rank of the
jth element of group i. (If values are equal for several
elements, all are given a rank equal to the average rank
for that set.) We define r¯i to be
1
ni
∑ni
j=1 rij , the mean
rank of group i, and r¯ to be n+12 , the average of all the
ranks. Then, the Kruskal-Wallis h-statistic is defined to
be
h = (n− 1)
∑g
i=1 ni(r¯i − r¯)2∑g
i=1
∑ni
j=1(rij − r¯)2
.
If there are no ties in the database, the denominator is
constant and the formula can be simplified to
h =
12
n(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
nir¯
2
i − 3(n+ 1).
5Throughout the paper we assume g is public and independent
of the data, so we don’t list it as a separate input. Because g is
the number of valid groups, one or more of the g groups might not
contain any observations. Allowing many valid groups that have
no actual observations artificially increases the critical value, so it
can reduce the power of our tests but does not affect the validity
or privacy of the output.
5
For clarity and consistency with later sections, we
present this calculation as an algorithm. In general we
use a subscript “stat” to label the algorithm computing
a test statistic and a subscript “p” to denote the fully
hypothesis test that outputs a p-value. We use tildes to
indicate private algorithms.
Algorithm KWstat : Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic
Input: x
for group i of x do
r¯i ←−
(∑ni
j=1 rij
)
/ni
h←− 12
n(n+1)
∑g
i=1 nir¯i − 3(n+ 1)
Output: h
3.2 Privatized Kruskal-Wallis
In this section, we bound the sensitivity of KWstat, al-
lowing us to create a private version. We then present a
complete algorithm for calculating a p-value and prove
that it too is differentially private. We begin with the
following sensitivity claim, proved in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 3.1. The sensitivity of KWstat is bounded by
87.
We are using the simplified formula that assumes there
are no ties in the data, so our algorithm begins by adding
a small amount of random noise to each data point to
randomly order any ties. We may then compute the
h-statistic as in the public setting and add noise propor-
tional to the sensitivity.
Algorithm K˜Wstat : Private Kruskal-Wallis Test
Statistic
Input: x, 
Rank all data points, randomly breaking ties
h←− KWstat(x)
h˜←− h+ Lap
(
87/
)
Output: h˜
Theorem 3.2. Algorithm K˜Wstat is -differentially pri-
vate.
See Appendix A.2 for the proof.
Algorithm K˜Wp is our complete algorithm to find a
p-value given a database x, privacy parameter . First a
private test statistic h˜ is computed. Then the reference
distribution is approximated by simulating z databases
under H0 and computing the test statistic for each.
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(The distribution of the test statistic is independent of
the distribution of data between groups and the distribu-
tion of the i.i.d. data points, so our choice of equal-sized
6When we use the traditional Kruskal-Wallis test, the dis-
tribution of h-statistics asymptotically converges to the χ2 dis-
tribution. Thus, for efficiency purposes, we sample hk from
χ2(g − 1) + Lap(∆h/)
Algorithm K˜Wp : Complete Kruskal-Wallis Test
Input: x, , z
h˜←− K˜Wstat(x, )
for k = 1 to z do
x∗ ←− a database with independent uniform
values from [0,1], divided almost equally into g
groups
hk ←− K˜Wstat(x∗);
p←− fraction of hk values greater than h˜
Output: h˜, p
groups and uniform data from [0, 1] is arbitrary.) The
p-value is the percent of hk more extreme than h˜.
Theorem 3.3. Algorithm K˜Wp is -differentially pri-
vate.
Proof. By Theorem 3.2, the computation of h˜ is -
differentially private. All of the following steps (gener-
ating the reference distribution and calculating p-value)
do not need to access to the database x, and therefore
by Theorem 2.4 (post processing), Algorithm K˜Wp is -
differentially private.
3.3 A New Test: Absolute Value
Kruskal-Wallis
We now introduce our own new test, specifically designed
for the private setting. Inspired by Swanberg et al. [31],
we alter the Kruskal-Wallis statistic, measuring distance
with the absolute value instead of the square of the dif-
ferences. This statistic is now
habs = (n− 1)
∑g
i=1 ni|r¯i − r¯|∑g
i=1
∑ni
j=1 |rij − r¯|
.
As before, when there are no ties in the data, the
statistic can be simplified. (See Appendix A.3 for the
calculation.) In this case, the form depends on the par-
ity of n.
habs =

4(n− 1)
n2
g∑
i=1
ni
∣∣∣∣r¯i − n+ 12
∣∣∣∣ , if n is even
4
n+ 1
g∑
i=1
ni
∣∣∣∣r¯i − n+ 12
∣∣∣∣ , if n is odd
We call the algorithm to calculate the habs test statistic
KWabsstat. This statistic is preferable for two reasons.
First, it has lower sensitivity. The following theorem is
prooved in Appendix A.4.
Theorem 3.4. The sensitivity of KWabsstat is bounded
by 8.
Second, the actual values for habs are significantly
higher than they are for h, so any given amount of noise
is less likely to overwhelm the value.
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Because of space constraints, we don’t give pseudocode
for this hypothesis test, but it follows exactly that of the
previous test. The privatized statistic is computed by
K˜Wabsstat, which adds Laplace noise in the same way
as for K˜Wstat, but scaled to the lower sensitivity. The
full hypothesis test, K˜Wabsp, computes the p value in the
same way as was done for K˜Wp.7
Theorem 3.5. Algorithm K˜Wabsstat and K˜Wabsp are -
differentially private.
Proof. The proof is identical to the proofs for Algorithms
K˜Wstat and K˜Wp (Theorems 3.2 and 3.3).
Unequal group sizes The traditional h statistic (and
therefore the noisy private analogue) has a reference dis-
tribution that is independent of the allocation of obser-
vations between groups. This is unfortunately not true
for our new habs statistic. Fortunately, it seems that
the worst-case distribution (i.e., the one resulting in the
highest critical value) occurs when all groups are of equal
size. (We present both theoretical and experimental ev-
idence for this in Appendix A.5.) As a result, it is safe
to always equal-sized groups when simulating a reference
distribution, though for very unequal group sizes, there
will be a significant loss in power compared to a hypo-
thetical where group sizes were known. (If approximate
group sizes are known publicly or released through other
queries, those could be used instead when simulating the
reference distribution.)
3.4 Experimental Results
Power analysis We now assess the power of our
K˜Wabsp test on synthetic data (See Appendix B.1 for
an application to real-world data.) We generate many
databases of data distributed with specified parameters
and then run K˜Wabsp on each. The power of the test
for a given set of parameters is the proportion of times
K˜Wabsp returns a significant result (i.e. a p-value less
than the significance level α, generally set at 0.05). We
use three groups of normally-distributed data, separated
by steps of one standard deviation (so the highest and
lowest groups differ by two standard deviations). In our
captions we denote the mean of group i with µi.
As shown in Figure 1, our private absolute value test
variant requires significantly less data points than the
original private test to reach the same power. Thus,
from here on, we only evaluate the power of the absolute
value variant. Figure 1 also shows that, at an  of 1,
our private absolute value test only requires a database
around a factor of 3 larger than the public test needs.
Uniformity of p-values If a test is correctly designed,
the probability of type 1 error (i.e., rejecting the null hy-
pothesis when it is correct) should be less than or equal
7Unlike before, a χ2 approximation cannot be used.
Figure 1: Power of K˜Wabsp at various values of  and total
sample size n. (Effect size: maxi(µi) − mini({µi) = 2σ;
g = 3; α = .05; equal group sizes; normally distributed
sample data)
to α for any chosen value of α. Comparing the fit of a
large number of simulated p-values generated from null
distributions to the uniform distribution on the unit in-
terval allows one to evaluate the uniformity of p-values
for a given hypothesis test. A common tool to carry
this procedure out, the quantile-quantile (or Q-Q) plot,
plots the quantiles of the uniform, theoretical distribu-
tion against the quantiles of the p-values. The theoret-
ical and emperical quantiles will be nearly equal at all
quantiles when the p-values follow the theoretical distri-
bution, resulting in a linear trend on the Q-Q plot. A
convex Q-Q plot indicates an increase in the type II error
rate (i.e. the test not rejecting the null hypothesis when
it is indeed not true, causing a decrease in power) which
is acceptable but undesirable, while a concave Q-Q plot
indicates an exceedingly high type I error rate (i.e. the
test rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true, causing
undue increases in power) which is not acceptable. Fig-
ure 2 demonstrates the p-value uniformity of K˜Wabsp.
See Appendix B.1 for a discussion of uniformity of p-
values with unequal group sizes.
Figure 2: A quantile-quantile plot of K˜Wabsp comparing
the distribution of simulated p-values to the uniform dis-
tribution at varying n, all with equal group sizes. (g = 3;
 = 1)
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Comparison to previous work The only prior work
on hypothesis testing for independence of two variables,
one continuous and one categorical, is that on ANOVA.
The best private ANOVA analogue is that of Swanberg et
al. [31]. In Figure 3 we compare K˜Wabsp to their test and
we find its power to be much greater. To get 80% power
with this effect size, our test requires only 23% as much
data as the private ANOVA test. (The effect size used
is the same as in [31].) We stress that this means our
test is significantly higher-power, in addition to being
usable for non-normal data. The test of Swanberg et
al. also requires that the analyst issuing the query can
accurately bound the range of the data—a bound that is
too tight or too loose will reduce the power of the test.
Our test works for data with unknown range.
Figure 3: Power of K˜Wabsp, Swanberg et. al.’s test [31],
and the public tests at various n. (Effect size: max(µn)−
min(µn) = 2σ;  = 1; g = 3; α = .05; equal group sizes;
continuous sample data)
Robustness of results Though it is unusual, it is pos-
sible that the relative power of different hypothesis tests
could change when different effect sizes are considered.
Therefore we repeat the analysis shown in Figure 1 with
a variety of different effect sizes, group sizes, and num-
ber of groups. We also vary the frequency of tied values
in the data, since the random ordering of tied values
adds additional noise for our statistic. Finally, we run
the comparison on real data comparing income and age.
The results of these experiments are shown in Appendix
B.1. We find that the results discussed above are consis-
tent across these variations.
4 Two Groups
We now consider the case of data with only two groups
(e.g., restricting our comparison to the methylation lev-
els of the bipolar subjects versus the healthy controls.)
In the public nonparametric setting, one could simply
use Kruskal-Wallis with g = 2, but one can also use the
Mann-Whitney U-test (also called the Wilcoxon rank-
sum test), proposed in 1945 by Frank Wilcoxon [39] and
formalized in 1947 by Henry Mann and Donald Whit-
ney [21]. In this section we construct a private version of
the Mann-Whitney test and compare it to simply using
K˜Wabsp with g = 2.
The standard parametric test in the public setting is
the two-sample t-test. We know of three prior works
that can, in some sense, be seen as providing an ana-
logue of the two-sample t-test for the standard private
setting. The only one for which this is an explicit goal
is that of D’Orazio et al. [9]. This test releases private
estimates of the difference in means and of the within-
group variance and produces a confidence interval rather
than a p-value. (The difference in means is done with
simple Laplace noise, while the variance estimate uses a
subsample-and-aggregate algorithm.) Most importantly,
they assume that the size of the two groups is public
knowledge, where we treat the categorical value of a data
point (ex., schizophrenic or not) to be private data.
There are two other works we know of that provide
a private analogue of the two-sample t-test as a result
of a slightly different goal. The first is Ding et al. [8],
who give a test under the more restrictive local differen-
tial privacy definition. This test is of course also private
under the standard differential privacy definition. The
other work is that of Swanberg et al. [31], who give a
private analogue of the ANOVA test, as discussed pre-
viously. In the public setting, ANOVA with g = 2 is
equivalent to the two-sample t-test. Based on (some-
what incomparable) experiments in their respective pa-
pers, it appears that the Swanberg et al. test is much
higher power, which is unsurprising given that it was de-
veloped for the centralized database model of privacy.
We therefore compare our work to this.
To our knowledge, there is no prior work specifically
on a private version of the Mann-Whitney test. As be-
fore, we find that our rank-based nonparametric tests
outperform the private parametric equivalent even when
the data is normally distributed. We also find that,
unlike in the public setting, the more generic Kruskal-
Wallace analogue (used with g = 2) outperforms the
more purpose-built test.
4.1 The Mann-Whitney test
The function used to calculate the Mann-Whitney U
statistic is formalized in Algorithm MWstat. As before,
x is a database of size n, with rij being the rank of the
jth data point in group i. A statistic is first calculated
for each group by summing the rankings in that group
and subtracting a term depending on the group size. We
then take the minimum of the two statistics to get U .
Compared to the other statistics we are considering, the
directionality of U is reversed — low values are inconsis-
tent with the null hypothesis and cause rejection, rather
than high values.
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Algorithm MWstat : Mann-Whitney Test Statistic
Input: x
for i ∈ {1, 2} do
Ri ←−
∑
j rij
Ui ←− Ri − ni(ni+1)2
U ←− min{U1, U2}
Output: U
4.2 A Differentially Private Algorithm
The global sensitivity of MWstat is n, but the local sen-
sitivity is lower. We prove the following in Appendix
A.6:
Theorem 4.1 (Sensitivity of MWstat). The local sensi-
tivity is given by LSMWstat(x) = max{n1, n2}, where n1
and n2 are the sizes of the two groups in x.
We can now define our private test statistic, M˜Wstat.
This algorithm first uses a portion of its privacy budget
(m) to estimate the size of the smallest group. This
value is then reduced to m∗, such that with probability
1 − δ we have n − m∗ > LSMWstat(x). This means that
we can then release U using noise proportional to n−m∗
(using the remaining privacy budget, U . See Appendix
A.7 for proof that M˜Wstat is (m + U , δ)-differentially
private.
Algorithm M˜Wstat : Private Mann-Whitney Test
Statistic
Input: x, m, U , δ
m←− min{n1, n2}
m˜←− m+ Lap
(
1
m
)
c←− − ln(2δ)m
m∗ ←− max(dm˜− ce , 0)
U˜ ←− MWstat(x) + Lap
(
n−m∗
U
)
Output: m˜, U˜
As before, M˜Wstat is not meaningful on its own; we
want an applicable reference distribution with which to
calculate a corresponding p-value. This is shown below
in algorithm M˜Wp. It works similarly to the analogous
algorithms K˜Wp and K˜Wabsp. The key difference is that
the reference distribution now depends on the group size
estimate m˜.8
A note on design In the case of K˜Wabsp we found
that the highest possible critical value came from a ref-
erence distribution with equal-size groups. For this test
that is not the case, so we cannot use equal-size groups
8The algorithm given simulates full databases to compute the
reference distribution. This is not particularly slow, but in Ap-
pendix A.8 we show that one can also sample from a normal dis-
tribution with certain parameters to get an acceptable reference
distribution more quickly.
Algorithm M˜Wp : Complete Mann-Whitney Test
Input: x, m,U ,δ, z
(m˜, U˜)←− M˜Wstat(x, m, U, δ)
m˜←− dmax(0, m˜)e
for k := 1 to z do
x∗ ←− a database with n independent uniform
values from [0,1] divided into 2 groups of size m˜
and n− m˜
Uk ←− M˜Wstat(x∗, m, U, δ)
p←− fraction of Uk less than U˜
Output: U˜ , p
when generating the reference distribution without unac-
ceptable type 1 error. As a result, we need an estimate
of group size. If we didn’t need this estimate for the
reference distribution, it is possible that M˜Wstat would
be more accurate by simply using the global sensitivity
bound on MWstat. (It would be a slightly higher sensitiv-
ity, but no privacy budget would need to be expended on
estimating m.) This is a good example of a point made
in Section 1: simply acheiving an accurate of estimate
of a test statistic is not enough. The ultimate goal of a
hypothesis test is a p-value, which also requires an ac-
curate reference distribution and high power in order to
minimize decision error.
Type 1 error The reference distribution in the M˜Wp
algorithm depends on m, which is only estimated by m˜,
so we need to experimentally verify that type 1 error
never exceeds α. See Appendix B.2 for evidence that
our estimate appears to be sufficiently accurate and for
additional discussion.
Theorem 4.2. Algorithm M˜Wp is (m + U , δ)-
differentially private.
Proof. By Theorem A.6, the computation of (m˜, U˜) is
(m + U , δ)-differentially private. All of the steps fol-
lowing this computation do not require access to the
database and are, thus, post processing. By Theo-
rem 2.4, it follows that the complete algorithm is also
(m + U , δ)-differentially private.
4.3 Experimental Results
Power analysis We first assessed the power of our test
on synthetic data.9 We run M˜Wp on many simulated
databases and report the percentage of the time that a
significant result was obtained. For our first effect size,
we have the two groups consist of normally distributed
data with means one standard deviation apart. In all
experiments we set δ = 10−6.
Our first step was to determine the optimal proportion
of the total privacy budget, tot, to allot to estimating m
9For application of our test to real-world data, see Appendix
B.2
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and the test statistic M˜Wstat. We found that the optimal
proportion of  to allot to estimating m is roughly .65,
experimentally confirmed at several choices of tot, ef-
fect size, total sample size n, group size ratios n1/n, and
underlying distribution. (See Appendix B.2 for more de-
tails.) We then fix the proportion of tot allotted to m
as .65 and vary tot and total sample size n to measure
the power of our test.
Figure 4: Power of M˜Wp at various values of tot and total
sample size n. (Effect size: µ1 − µ2 = 1σ; proportion of
tot to m = .65; α = .05; m:(n−m) = 1)
As shown in Figure 4, the power loss due to privacy is
not unreasonably large. At an tot of 1, the test only
requires a database that is approximately a factor of
3 larger than that needed for the public test to reach
a power of 1. As one might expect, the database size
needed to detect a given effect has a roughly inverse re-
lationship with tot. In the appendix we perform a simi-
lar power analysis, varying effect size rather than sample
size.
Uniformity of p-values Algorithm M˜Wp uses the pri-
vatized group sample sizes m∗, (n − m∗) in place of the
true group sizes n1, n2 in order to simulate the reference
distribution. Naturally, then, one may wonder how con-
servative our critical values are as a result of ensuring
that the type 1 error rate does not exceed α. As shown
in Figure 5, the type I error rate of our test does not
exceed α when group sample sizes are equal. As total
sample size n increases, the p-value quantiles asymptot-
ically approach that of the theoretical distribution. In
Appendix B.2, we also examine uniformity of p-values of
M˜Wp with unequal group sizes and a variation of M˜Wp
that assumes equal group sizes.
Comparison to previous work The best existing
test applicable in the same use case is that of Swanberg
et al. [31]. Their differentially private ANOVA test can
be used in the 2-group case to compare to our Mann-
Whitney test. The results of this comparison, using
the same paramater settings chosen for optimal power
in their test, can be seen in Figure 6, where our test
Figure 5: A quantile-quantile plot of M˜Wp varying n.
(tot = 1; proportion of tot to m = .65; m:(n −m)= 1;
normally distributed sample data)
offers a substantial power increase.
Figure 6: Power of M˜Wp and Swanberg et. al.’s test at
various n. (tot = 1; Effect size: µ1−µ2 = 1σ; proportion
of tot to m = .65; α = .05; m:(n − m) = 1), normally
distributed sample data
Comparing M˜Wp and K˜Wabsp Both the Mann-
Whitney and the Kruskal-Wallis can be used to com-
pare the distributions of samples from two groups. As
shown in Figure 7, we find that in the private setting,
K˜Wabsp is more statistically powerful than M˜Wp. This
is perhaps surprising, since one might expect the test
developed specifically for the two-group case to perform
better. But this is an example of how some tests priva-
tize more easily than others. M˜Wp requires knowledge of
the group sizes, using up a fraction of the privacy bud-
get, while the K˜Wabsp statistic is not dependent on group
size.
We did find one exception to this finding. If the ana-
lyst knows a priori that the two groups are of equal size
(e.g., the data collection method guaranteed an equal
number in each group) then M˜Wp can be run using an
exact value of n/2 for the local sensitivity without the
need to dedicate any privacy budget to estimating m.
This increases the accuracy of M˜Wstat both by reducing
the sensitivity used to add noise and by increasing the
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Figure 7: Power of M˜Wp and K˜Wabsp at various n and
. (Effect size: max(µn) −min(µn) = 1σ; g = 2; α = .05;
equal group sizes; normally distributed sample data)
privacy budget allocated to U . We find that in this case
M˜Wp is superior to K˜Wabsp. See Appendix B.2 for more
details.
5 Paired Data
We now consider a third situation, where there are two
groups and the observations in those groups are paired.
While this scenario did not exist in the original psychotic
disease study, one can imagine recording the methylation
levels of one of the groups before and after administer-
ing medication. Each subject then contributes a pair
of data (ui, vi) that are highly correlated with one an-
other. One can assess the impact of the medication by
considering whether the set of n differences, {vi−ui}i, is
plausibly centered at zero. The standard nonparametric
hypothesis test for this situation is the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, proposed in 1945 by Frank Wilcoxon [40]. The
parametric alternative is a simple one-sample t-test run
on the set of differences.
This is the one setting where we are aware of prior
work on a nonparametric test. Task and Clifton [33]
gave the first private analogue of the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, referred to from here on as the TC test, in
2016. Our test makes two key improvements to theirs
and exhibits higher power. We also correct some errors
in their work. We discuss the differences in more detail
in Section 5.3.
Despite its status as one of the most commonly used
hypothesis tests, to our knowledge there is no practical,
implementable private version of a one-sample t-test in
the literature. In Section 5.4 we discuss some work that
comes close, and then we give our own first attempt at
a private t-test. We again find that our nonparametric
test has significantly higher power than this parametric
alternative.
5.1 The Wilcoxon signed-rank test
The function calculating the Wilcoxon test statistic is
formalized in AlgorithmW. Given a database x contain-
ing sets of pairs (ui, vi), the test computes the difference
di of each pair, drops any with di = 0, and then ranks
them by magnitude. (If magnitudes are equal for several
differences, all are given a rank equal to the average rank
for that set.)
Algorithm Wstat : Wilcoxon Test Statistic
Input: x
for row i of x do
di ←− |vi − ui|
si ←− Sign(vi − ui)
Order the terms from lowest to highest di
Drop any di = 0
for row i of x do
ri ←− rank of row i
w ←−∑i siri
Output: w
Under the null hypothesis that ui and vi are drawn
from the same distribution, the distribution of the test
statistic W can be calculated exactly using combinato-
rial techniques. This becomes computationally infeasible
for large databases, but an approximation exists in the
form of the normal distribution with mean 0 and vari-
ance nr(nr+1)(2nr+1)6 , where nr is the number of rows
that were not dropped. Knowing this, one can calculate
the p-value for any particular value of w.
5.2 Our Differentially Private Algorithm
At a high level, our algorithm is quite straightforward
and similar to prior work: we compute a test statistic as
one might in the public case and add Laplacian noise to
make it private. However, there are several important
innovations relative to Task and Clifton that greatly in-
crease the power of our test.
Our first innovation is to use a different variant of the
Wilcoxon test statistic. While the version introduced
in Section 5.1 is the one most commonly used, other
versions have long existed in the statistics literature. In
particular, we look at a variant introduced by Pratt in
1959 [25]. In this variant, rather than dropping rows
with di = 0, those rows are included. When di = 0 we
set si = Sign(di) = 0, so those rows contribute nothing
to the resultant statistic, but they do push up the rank
of other rows.
In the public setting, the Pratt variant is not very dif-
ferent from the standard Wilcoxon, being slightly more
or less powerful depending on the exact effect one is try-
ing to detect [7]. In the private setting, however, the
difference is substantial.
The benefit to the Pratt variant comes from how the
test statistics are interpreted. In the standard Wilcoxon,
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Algorithm WPstat: Wilcoxon Test Statistic - Pratt
Variant
Input: x
for row i of x do
di ←− |vi − ui|
si ←− Sign(vi − ui)
Order the terms from lowest to highest di
for row i of x do
ri ←− rank of row i
w ←−∑i siri
Output: w
it is known that the test statistic follows an approxi-
mately normal distribution, but the variance of that dis-
tribution is a function of nr, the number of non-zero di
values. In the private setting, this number is not known,
and this has caused substantial difficulty in prior work.
(See Section 5.3 for more discussion.) On the other hand,
the Pratt variant produces a test statistic that is always
compared to the same normal distribution, which de-
pends only on n. The algorithm W˜Pstat that outputs a
differentially private analogue is shown below.
Algorithm W˜Pstat : Private Wilcoxon Test
Statistic
Input: x, 
w ←−WPstat(x)
w˜ ←− w + Lap
(
2n

)
Output: w˜
Theorem 5.1. Algorithm W˜Pstat is -differentially pri-
vate.
See Appendix A.9 for proof of Theorem 5.1.
To complete the design of our test, we compute a ref-
erence distribution through simulation as was done in
K˜Wabsp and M˜Wp. Here we use the standard normal ap-
proximation for the distribution of the w test statistic,
though one could simulate full databases as well. We call
this algorithm W˜Pp.
Algorithm W˜Pp : Complete Wilcoxon Test
Input: x, , z
w˜ ←− W˜Pstat(x, )
for k = 1 to z do
wk ←− Normal(0, n(n+ 1)(2n+ 1)/6) + Lap(2n/);
p←− fraction of wk more extreme than w˜
Output: w˜, p
Theorem 5.2. Algorithm W˜Pp is -differentially pri-
vate.
Proof. The computation of w˜ was already shown to be
private. The remaining computation needed to find the
p-value does not need access to the database—it is sim-
ply post-processing. By Theorem 2.4, it follows that the
W˜Pp algorithm is also private.
5.3 Experimental Results
Power analysis We assess the power of our
differentially-private Wilcoxon signed-rank test first on
synthetic data. (For tests with real data, see Appendix
B.3.) In order to measure power, we must first fix an
effect size. We chose to have the ui and vi values both
generated according to normal distributions with means
one standard deviation apart. We then measure the sta-
tistical power of Algorithm W˜Pp (for a given choice of
n and ) by repeatedly randomly sampling a database
x from that distribution and then running W˜Pp on that
database.10 The power is the percentage of the time W˜Pp
returns a p-value less than α. See Appendix B.3 for a
similar analysis of power, varying effect size rather than
sample size.
Figure 8: Power of W˜Pp at various  and n. (Effect size:
µu−µv = 1σ; α = .05; normally distributed sample data)
Uniformity of p-values In algorithm W˜Pp we draw
our reference distribution samples (the wk values) as-
suming there are no di = 0 rows. The distribution will
technically differ slightly when there are many rows with
di = 0, so we need to confirm experimentally that the dif-
ference is inconsequential or otherwise acceptable.
Figure 9 shows a Q-Q plot of W˜Pp on three sets of
p-values, all generated under H0, with  = 1, n = 500.
When there are no ties in the original data (0% of di = 0),
the Q-Q plot line is indistinguishable from the identity
line, indicating that the test is properly calibrated. En-
couragingly, introducing a substantial number of ties into
the data (30% of di = 0) has little noticeable effect. In
order to induce non-uniformity in the p-values, one needs
an extremely high proportion of rows with di = 0. The
curve with 90% zero values is shown as an illustration.
When the proportion of zeros is very high, the variance
10Our actual implementation differs slightly from this. To save
time when running a huge number of tests with identical n and ,
we first generate the reference distribution Wk values, which can
be reused across runs.
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of the p-values will be narrower than the reference distri-
bution, resulting in a lower critical value. Since the value
we are using is higher, our test is overly conservative,11
but this is acceptable as type I error is still below α.
Figure 9: A quantile-quantile plot of W˜Pp comparing the
distribution of simulated p-values to the uniform dis-
tribution ( = 1, n = 500; normally distributed sample
data).
Comparison to previous work In 2016, Task and
Clifton [33] introduced the first differentially private ver-
sion of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, from here on re-
ferred to as the TC test. Our work improves upon their
test in two ways. We describe the two key differences
below, and then compare the power of our test to theirs.
We also found a significant error in their work.12 All
comparisons are made to our implementation of the TC
test with the relevant error corrected.
Task and Clifton compute an analytic upper bound
on the critical value t∗. For a given n and , the pri-
vate test statistic w˜ under H0 is sampled according to a
sum W + Λ, where W is a random draw from a normal
distribution (scaled according to n) and Λ is a Laplace
random variable (scaled according to n and ). In partic-
ular, say that b is a value such that Pr[W > b] < β and g
is a value such that Pr[Λ > g] < γ. Then we can compute
the following bound. (The last line follows from the fact
that the two events are independent.)
Pr[W˜ > b+ g] < Pr[W > b or Λ > g]
= Pr[W > b] + Pr[Λ > g]
− Pr[W > b and Λ > g]
= β + γ − βγ
Task and Clifton always set γ = .01 and then vary
the choice of β such that they have α = β + γ − βγ for
11One could try to estimate the number of zeros to be less con-
servative, but that would require allocating some of the privacy
budget towards that estimate, which is not worth it in most cir-
cumstances.
12This error has been confirmed by Task and Clifton in personal
correspondence.
whatever α is intended as the significance threshold.13
The bound described above is correct but very loose,
and our simulation method gives drastically lower critical
values. Table 1 contains examples of the critical values
achieved by each method for several parameter choices.
More values can be found in Appendix B.3, where we
also experimentally confirm that these values result in
acceptable type 1 error.
Table 1: Critical Value Comparison for n = 100
 α Public New TC
1 0.1 1.282 1.417 2.680
0.05 1.645 1.826 3.091
0.025 1.960 2.186 3.511
0.1 0.1 1.282 5.684 14.786
0.05 1.645 8.063 15.197
0.025 1.960 10.438 15.617
0.01 0.1 1.282 55.350 135.843
0.05 1.645 79.233 136.254
0.025 1.960 103.116 136.674
Critical values for n = 100 and several values of  and α.
To allow easy comparison, these values are for a normal-
ized W statistic, i.e., W has been divided by the relevant
constant so that it is (before the addition of Laplacian
noise) distributed according to a standard normal. See
Appendix B.3 for the equivalent table at n = 1000.
Our second key change from the TC test, mentioned
earlier, is that we handle rows with di = 0 according to
the Pratt variant of the Wilcoxon, rather than dropping
them completely as is more traditional. The reason the
traditional method is so difficult in the private setting
is that the reference distribution one must compare to
depends on the number of rows that were dropped. If nr
is the number of non-zero rows (i.e., rows that weren’t
dropped), one is supposed to look up the critical value
associated with nr, rather than the original size n of the
database.
Unfortunately, nr is a sensitive value and cannot be
released privately.14 Task and Clifton show that it is ac-
ceptable (in that it does not result in type I error greater
than α) to compare to a critical value for a value of nr
that is lower than the actual value. This allows them to
give two options for how one might deal with the lack of
knowledge about nr.
High Utility This version of the TC test simply as-
sumes nr ≥ .3n and uses the critical value that would
be correct for nr = .3n. We stress that this algo-
13This is where Task and Clifton make an error. This formula is
correct, but they used an incorrect density function for the Laplace
distribution and as a result calculated incorrect values of g.
14A private estimate could be released, but one would have to
devote a significant portion of the privacy budget for the hypothe-
sis test to this estimate, greatly decreasing the accuracy/power of
W˜stat.
13
rithm is not actually differentially private, though
it could easily be captured by a sufficiently weak-
ened definition that limited the universe of allow-
able databases. Another problem is that for most
realistic data, nr is much greater than .3n and using
this loose lower bound still results in a large loss of
power.
High Privacy This version adds k dummy values to
the database with di = ∞ and k with di = −∞.15
Then one can be certain of the bound nr ≥ 2k. This
is a guaranteed bound so this variant truly satisfies
differential privacy. On the other hand it is a very
loose lower bound in most cases, leading to a large
loss of power.
Experimental comparison We compare the statisti-
cal power of our test to that of the TC test. We begin by
again measuring the power when detecting the difference
between two normal distributions with means one stan-
dard deviation apart. The results can be seen in Figure
10. If we look at the database size needed to achieve
80% power, we find that the 32 data points we need,
while more than the public test (14), are many fewer
than the TC High Utility variant (80) or the TC High
Privacy variant (122). Appendix B.3 includes a figure
for  = .1 as well. What we see is that, while all private
tests require more data, our test (requiring n ≈ 236) still
requires about 40% as much data as the TC High Utility
variant (588). The TC High Privacy variant, however,
scales much less well to low  and requires roughly 2974
data points.
Figure 10: Power of the TC test, W˜Pp, and the public
test at various n. (Effect size: µu − µv = 1σ,  = 1;
α = .05; normally distributed sample data)
The results in Figure 10 use a continuous distribution
for the real data, so there are no data points with di =
0. Because one of the crucial differences between our
algorithms is the method for handling these zero values,
we also consider the effect when there are a large number
15Task and Clifton do not discuss how to choose k, and in our
experimental comparisons we set k = 15, the same value they use.
of zeros in Appendix B.3. Overall, we see that both in
situations with no zero values and situations with many,
our test achieves the rigorous privacy guarantees of the
TC High Privacy test while achieving greater utility than
the TC High Utility test.
Relative contribution of improvements Given
that we make two meaningful changes to the TC test,
one might naturally wonder whether both are truly use-
ful or whether the vast majority of the improvement
comes from one of the two changes. To test this, we
compare to an updated variant of the TC test where we
calculate critical values exactly through simulation, as
we do in our algorithm, but otherwise run the TC test
unchanged (referred to as ”High Privacy +” and ”High
Utility +”). The result is presented in Figure 11, where
we find the resulting algorithm to rest comfortably be-
tween the original TC test and our proposed test. This
means that both the change to the critical value calcu-
lation and the switch to the Pratt method of handling
di = 0 rows are important contributions to achieving the
power of our test.
Figure 11: Power comparison of the TC algorithms, the
TC algorithms with our critical values (denoted with a
+), our new algorithm, and the public algorithm at var-
ious sample sizes n. (Effect size: µu − µv = 1σ;  = 1;
α = .05)
5.4 Parametric Alternative: A New T-
test
The parametric analog to the Wilcoxon test is to run
a one sample t-test on the set of differences {vi − ui}i
to see if their mean is significantly different from zero
(also called a paired t-test). There has been surprisingly
little work on the creation of a private version of a one
sample t-test. Karwa and Vadhan [19] study private con-
fidence intervals, which are in a sense equivalent to a t-
test. However, their analysis is asymptotic and they say
that the algorithm does not give practical results with
database size in the thousands. Sheffet [27] provides a
method for calculating private coefficient estimates for
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linear regression and also transforms the t-distribution
to provide an appropriate reference distribution for in-
ference. In the public setting, one can convert a test on
regression coefficients to a one sample t-test but choosing
a constant independent variable and making the sample
data the dependent variable. However, Sheffet’s method
only works when all variables are significantly spread out,
so this method fails.
Here we propose what we believe is the first private
version of a one sample t-test, with two arguable excep-
tions. The first is simultaneous work by Gaboardi et
al. [15] in the local privacy model. We compare our re-
sults to theirs in more detail in Section 5.5. The other
work is that of Solea [30], but according to Solea’s own
experiments that test often gives type 1 error rates well
above the chosen α for many parameter choices, so we
don’t consider it a usable test.
The database for a one sample t-test has observations
x1, . . . , xn assumed to come from a normal distribution
with mean µ and standard deviation σ. (For paired data,
each observation is the differences between the observa-
tion in the two groups). The test statistic is given by
Tstat(x) = x¯s/
√
n
, where x¯ is the mean of the data and s
is the standard deviation of the data.
A private t-test As before, we achieve privacy
through the addition of Laplacian noise, but the sensitiv-
ity of Tstat is unbounded, so we instead release separate
private estimates of the numerator and denominator. For
this analysis, similar to the private ANOVA tests [31], we
assume that the data is scaled such that all observations
are on the interval [−1, 1]. We first find the sensitivities
of x¯ and s2 and then use post-processing, composition,
and the Laplace Mechanism to combine these to obtain
the private t-statistic. In the case where s2 is estimated
to be negative, the test statistic cannot be computed as
normal, and we return 0, indicating an unwillingness to
reject the null hypothesis.
Theorem 5.3. The sensitivity of x¯ is 2n .
Theorem 5.4. The sensitivity of s2 is 5n−1 .
See Appendix A.10 for proof of Theorem 5.3 and 5.4.
Algorithm T˜stat: Private t-Test Statistic
Input: x, x¯, s2˜¯x = x¯+ Lap( 1/nx¯ )
s˜2 = s2 + Lap( 5/(n−1)s2 )
if s˜2 < 0 then
T˜ = 0
else
T˜ =
̂¯x/n√
ŝ2/
√
n
Output: T˜
Theorem 5.5. Algorithm T˜stat is (x¯+s2)-differentially
private.
Proof. By the Laplace mechanism, the computation of˜¯x is x¯-differentially private and the computation of s˜2
is s2 -differentially private. Since the computation of T˜
does not require access to the database, it is only post-
processing and its release is (x¯ + s2)-differentially pri-
vate.
To carry out the full paired t-test, we estimate the
reference distribution through simulation and release a
private p-value.
Algorithm T˜p : Complete t-Test
Input: x, x¯, s2 , z
t˜ := T˜stat(x, x¯, s2 )
for k = 1 to z do
x∗ ←− a database with n independent draws
from N(µ = 0, σ ≈ 0.3), each truncated to [−1, 1]
tk ←− T˜stat(x∗)
p←− fraction of tk more extreme than t˜
Output: t˜, p
Theorem 5.6. Algorithm T˜p is x¯+s2-differentially pri-
vate.
Proof. The computation of t˜ was already shown to be
private. The remaining computation needed to find the
p-value does not need access to the database—it is sim-
ply post-processing. By Theorem 2.4, it follows that the
T˜p algorithm is also private.
5.5 Experimental t-Test evaluation
We first must set a parameter in our T˜p algorithm. In
particular, for a given total , we must decide how to
allocate the budget between x¯ and s2 . We choose this
allocation experimentally, deciding to allocate 50% of
the budget towards each value. This is nontrivial, and
Appendix B.4 contains experimental results and further
discussion. Luckily, the exact choice of this allocation
does not seem to have a large effect on the power of the
test.
We then evaluate the power and validity of the final
T˜p test.
Comparison to other work Simultaneous to our
work, Gaboardi et al. [15] developed a private one sample
t-test under the more restrictive local differential privacy
model. As one might expect, our test in the more stan-
dard setting is much higher power. They develop both
a t-test and a z-test, which is equivalent to the t-test
except that the variance of the data is assumed to be
already known. Only the z-test is given experimental
evaluation, but with an effect size three times the size
we use in our experiments, their test (at  = 1) requires
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roughly 4000 data points to reach 80% power, while our
test requires roughly 100. Their t-test would presumably
require even more data.
Comparison to nonparametric test Since we have
already developed a test for the paired-data use case, we
assessed the power of T˜p in comparison to W˜Pp by simu-
lating synthetic data as described in Section 5.3. Just as
in the many groups and two groups scenarios, the non-
parametric test substantially outperforms its parametric
counterpart, as shown in Figure 12. In this case, W˜Pp
needs 8% of the data required by T˜p to reach the same
power.
Figure 12: Power of T˜p and W˜Pp at various  and n.
(Effect size: µu − µv = 1σ; α = .05; normally distributed
sample data)
Uniformity of p-values As with all of our tests, we
experimentally ensure that type I error rate is bounded
by α in Figure 13. This figure confirms the fact that our
type I error rate is bounded above by α. For small sample
sizes, the line on the quantile-quantile plot goes above
the diagonal. This is the acceptable direction, the sign
of a conservative test. In this case it occurs because some
test statistics in the reference distribution are set to zero
(as a result of noise added for privacy overwhelming s˜2).
If, for example, 10% of the reference distribution samples
are at zero, then p values below 10% are impossible. As
shown by the n = 1000 line, at sufficiently large sample
sizes this effect essentially vanishes.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced several new tests, of which three
(K˜Wabsp, M˜Wp, and W˜Pp) are improvements on the state
of the art. These allow researchers to address inferential
questions using nonparametric methods while preserving
the privacy of the data. More broadly, we found that the
basic idea of using ranks in the private setting is potent.
Not only do they remove the need to assume a bound
on the data, they also directly increase statistical power.
Figure 13: A quantile-quantile plot of T˜p at various n.
( = 1; equal  allotment to each statistic)
When working with many groups, two group, or with
paired data, rank-based tests are more powerful than
their parametric analogues and can be made yet more
powerful through sensible adaptations. We hope others
will push this technique forward — we have no reason to
believe that our tests are optimal.
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A Supplementary Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We begin by introducing the following lemma and corol-
laries, which will be useful in the proof.
Lemma A.1. For integers a and b:
b∑
k=a
k =
(b− a+ 1)(b+ a)
2
Corollary A.2. For group i which has ni elements with
rankings ri1, . . . , rini , we can bound the sum of the ranks
by:
ni(ni + 1)
2
≤
ni∑
j=1
rij ≤ ni(2n− ni + 1)
2
Proof. The maximum occurs when all the terms in the
sum are as high as possible. I.e., they are n− ni + 1, n−
ni + 2, . . . , n− 1, n. Thus,
ni∑
j=1
rij ≤
n∑
k=n−ni+1
k
=
(n− (n− ni + 1) + 1)(n+ (n− ni + 1))
2
=
ni(2n− ni + 1)
2
The minimum occurs when all the terms in the sum
are as low as possible. I.e., they are 1, 2, . . . , ni − 1, ni.
Thus,
ni∑
j=1
rij ≥
ni∑
k=1
k
=
(ni − 1 + 1)(ni + 1)
2
=
ni(ni + 1)
2
Corollary A.3. Suppose there are g groups in the
database, then ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ g,
1 + ni
2
≤ r¯i ≤ 2n− ni + 1
2
,
where ni is the group size.
Proof. We define r¯i to be
1
ni
∑ni
j=1 rij . The proof follows
directly from this definition.
We now prove the main theorem:
Theorem. The sensitivity of KWstat is bounded by 87.
Proof. The proof proceeds as a series of cases. Neighbor-
ing databases x, x′ differ by a change in one row, and
this difference will cause either the row’s rank, group,
or both to change. The first case bounds the change
in the test statistic when only the row’s rank changes.
The second case is when the row’s group changes. Be-
cause our algorithm first randomly breaks any ties, we
assume there are no tied values in the database when h
is computed.
Case 1: Changing row retains group
Consider two databases that differ only in that one row
is “moved” from rank p to rank q. Let us assume without
loss of generality that the row is an element of group 1,
so it follows that n1 ≥ 1. We define the distance between
the rows to be d = |q − p| and ai to be the number of
elements in group i between row p and row q (excluding
row p and including row q).
|h′ − h| =
∣∣∣∣ 12n(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
nir¯′
2
i − 3(n+ 1)− 12
n(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
nir¯
2
i + 3(n+ 1)
∣∣∣∣
=
12
n(n+ 1)
∣∣∣∣ g∑
i=1
ni
(
r¯′2i − r¯2i
)∣∣∣∣
=
12
n(n+ 1)
∣∣∣∣ g∑
i=1
ni
(
1
n2i
( ni∑
j=1
r′ij
)2
− 1
n2i
( ni∑
j=1
rij
)2)∣∣∣∣
=
12
n(n+ 1)
∣∣∣∣ g∑
i=1
1
ni
(( ni∑
j=1
r′ij
)2
−
( ni∑
j=1
rij
)2)∣∣∣∣
≤ 12
n(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ 1ni
(( ni∑
j=1
r′ij
)2
−
( ni∑
j=1
rij
)2)∣∣∣∣
The final step follows by the triangle inequality. Let
us define zi to be
zi =
1
ni
∣∣∣∣( ni∑
j=1
r′ij
)2
−
( ni∑
j=1
rij
)2∣∣∣∣
The “movement” of the row causes all of the elements
of group 1 between p and q to change in the opposite
direction of the movement (if q > p, then all the ranks
decrease by 1, while if q < p, then all the ranks increase
by 1). This yields a total change in the rankings of group
1 of d− a1. Thus,
z1 =
1
n1
∣∣∣∣( ni∑
j=1
rij ± (d− a1)
)2
−
( ni∑
j=1
rij
)2∣∣∣∣
=
1
n1
∣∣∣± 2(d− a1) ni∑
j=1
rij + (d− a1)2
∣∣∣
=
1
n1
∣∣∣± 2(d− a1)n1r¯1 + (d− a1)2∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣ (d− a1)2
n1
± 2 · (d− a1) · r¯1
∣∣∣
≤ (n− 1)
2
n1
+ 2 · (n− 1) · r¯1
≤ (n− 1)2 + 2 · (n− 1) · 2n− n1 + 1
2
≤ (n− 1)2 + 2 · (n− 1) · n
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Similarly,
g∑
i=2
|zi| =
g∑
i=2
1
ni
∣∣∣∣( ni∑
j=1
rij ± ai
)2
−
( ni∑
j=1
rij
)2∣∣∣∣
=
g∑
i=2
1
ni
∣∣∣a2i ± 2ai ni∑
j=1
rij
∣∣∣
=
g∑
i=2
1
ni
∣∣∣a2i ± 2ainir¯i∣∣∣
=
g∑
i=2
∣∣∣a2i
ni
± 2air¯i
∣∣∣
≤
g∑
i=2
a2i
ni
+ 2
g∑
i=2
air¯i
≤
g∑
i=2
n2i
ni
+ 2
g∑
i=2
nir¯i
≤ n+ 2
g∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
rij
≤ n+ (n+ 1)n
Then,
|h′ − h| ≤ 12
n(n+ 1)
(
(n− 1)2 + 2 · (n− 1) · n+ n+ (n+ 1)n
)
≤ 12
n(n+ 1)
(
4(n+ 1)n
)
≤ 48
Thus with only a row change, ∆h = 48.
Case 1: Changing row changes group
Consider two databases that differ only in that one
row’s rank is changed from p to q and its group is changed
from, without loss of generality, group 1 to group 2.
We define ai as previously. We note again that the
sign of ai depends on the relationship between p and q.
If q > p, then the sign is negative; if q < p, then the sign
is positive.
We begin by introducing a lemma we will use through-
out this argument:
Lemma A.4. We can bound this summation as follows:
g∑
i=3
1
ni
(( ni∑
j=1
rij ± ai
)2
−
( ni∑
j=1
rij
)2)
≤ n2 + 2n
Proof.
g∑
i=3
1
ni
(( ni∑
j=1
rij ± ai
)2
−
( ni∑
j=1
rij
)2)
≤
g∑
i=3
1
ni
(( ni∑
j=1
rij + ai
)2
−
( ni∑
j=1
rij
)2)
= 2
g∑
i=3
ni∑
j=1
airij
ni
+
g∑
i=3
a2i
ni
≤ 2
g∑
i=3
ni∑
j=1
rij +
g∑
i=3
ai
≤ 2
(n(n+ 1)
2
)
+
g∑
i=3
ni
≤ (n2 + n) + n ≤ n2 + 2n
When we change the group of the moving row, we
must consider the sensitivity in each of three sub-cases:
Case 2a: n1 > 1, n2 > 0
|h′ − h| =
∣∣∣∣ 12n(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
n′ir¯′
2
i − 3(n+ 1)− 12
n(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
nir¯
2
i + 3(n+ 1)
∣∣∣∣
=
12
n(n+ 1)
∣∣∣∣ g∑
i=1
n′ir¯′
2
i −
g∑
i=1
nir¯
2
i
∣∣∣∣
=
12
n(n+ 1)
∣∣∣∣ g∑
i=1
(
1
n′i
( ni∑
j=1
r′ij
)2
− 1
ni
( ni∑
j=1
rij
)2)∣∣∣∣
Let us define zi to be
1
n′i
( ni∑
j=1
r′ij
)2
− 1
ni
( ni∑
j=1
rij
)2
.
When the expression inside the absolute value is less
than zero, ∆h can be written as
|h′ − h| = 12
n(n+ 1)
( g∑
i=1
−zi
)
.
Then we can bound this quantity as follows.
−z1 = − 1
n1 − 1
( n1∑
j=1
r1j − p− a1
)2
+
1
n1
( n1∑
j=1
r1j
)2
≤ − 1
n1 − 1
( n1∑
j=1
r1j − n− (n1 − 1)
)2
+
1
n1
( n1∑
j=1
r1j
)2
= −
(∑n1
j=1 r1j
)2
(n1 − 1)n1 −
(n+ n1 − 1)2
n1 − 1 +
2(n+ n1 − 1)
∑n1
j=1 r1j
n1 − 1
≤ −0− 0 + (n+ n1 − 1)(2n− n1 + 1)n1
n1 − 1
= (n+ n1 − 1)(2n− n1 + 1) + (n+ n1 − 1)(2n− n1 + 1)
n1 − 1
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Through differentiation of the first term with respect
to n1, we get that the maximum occurs when n1 =
n+2
2 .
This gives that the first term is bounded by 9n
2
4 . We
then differentiate the second term with respect to n1 and
get that the slope is always negative, which means that
the maximum of the second term maximum occurs when
n1 = 2. Then the second term is bounded by 2n
2 +n− 1.
Therefore,
−z1 ≤ 9n
2
4
+ 2n2 + n− 1 ≤ 17n
2
4
+ n− 1.
When i = 2:
−z2 = − 1
n2 + 1
( n2∑
j=1
r2j + q − a2
)2
+
1
n2
( n2∑
j=1
r2j
)2
≤ − 1
n2 + 1
( n2∑
j=1
r2j + 1− n2
)2
+
1
n2
( n2∑
j=1
r2j
)2
=
(∑n2
j=1 r2j
)2
n2(n2 + 1)
− (1− n2)
2
n2 + 1
+
2(n2 − 1)
(∑n2
j=1 r2j
)
n2 + 1
≤ (2n− n2 + 1)
2n2
4(n2 + 1)
− 0 + (n2 − 1)(2n− n2 + 1)n2
n2 + 1
≤ (2n− n2 + 1)
2
4
+ (n2 − 1)(2n− n2 + 1)
It is clear that the first term is bounded by n2. Then
for the other term, we can take the derivative with re-
spect to n1, which gives that the maximum occurs when
n2 = n + 1. But as n2 ≤ n and the graph is concave
down, we can use n2 = n. Thus, that term is bounded
by (n− 1)(2n− n+ 1) = n2 − 1.
Therefore,
−z2 ≤ 2n2 − 1.
When i > 2, we consider the sum of them:
−
g∑
i=3
zi = −
g∑
i=3
1
ni
(( ni∑
j=1
rij − ai
)2
−
( ni∑
j=1
rij
)2)
= −
g∑
i=3
ni + 2
g∑
i=3
ni∑
j=1
rij
≤ −(n− n1 − n2) + 2
g∑
i=3
ni∑
j=1
rij
≤ −(n− n1 − n2) + 2 · (n1 + n2 + 1 + n)(n− n1 − n2)
2
= −(n− n1 − n2) + n2 − (n1 + n2)2 + (n− n1 − n2)
≤ n2 − 9
Then combining them together, it follows that
|h′ − h| ≤ 12
n(n+ 1)
(
17n2
4
+ n− 1 + n2 + n2 − 1 + n2 − 9
)
=
12
n(n+ 1)
(
29n2
4
+ n− 1
)
= 87
When the expression inside the absolute value bars is
greater than zero, we can bound this quantity as follows:
z1 =
1
n1 − 1
( n1∑
j=1
r1j − p± a1
)2
− 1
n1
( n1∑
j=1
r1j
)2
≤ 1
n1 − 1
( n1∑
j=1
r1j − p+ a1
)2
− 1
n1
( n1∑
j=1
r1j
)2
Then consider −p + a1. As it is +a1, it matches the
case p > q, and thus −p+ a1 is negative and we can drop
it directly.
It follows that
z1 ≤ 1
n1 − 1
( n1∑
j=1
r1j
)2
− 1
n1
( n1∑
j=1
r1j
)2
=
(∑n1
j=1 r1j
)2
n1(n1 − 1)
≤ (2n− n1 + 1)
2n21
4(n1 − 1)n1
≤ (2n− 2 + 1)
2n21
2
≤ 4n
2 − 4n+ 1
2
Similarly,
z2 =
1
n2 + 1
( n2∑
j=1
r2j + q ± a2
)2
− 1
n2
( n2∑
j=1
r2j
)2
≤ 1
n2 + 1
( n2∑
j=1
r2j + q + a2
)2
− 1
n2
( n2∑
j=1
r2j
)2
=
1
n2 + 1
( n2∑
j=1
r2j + (q + n2)
)2
− 1
n2
( n2∑
j=1
r2j
)2
= −
(∑n2
j=1 r2j
)2
n2(n2 + 1)
+
(q + n2)
2
n2 + 1
+
2(q + n2)
∑n2
j=1 r2j
n2 + 1
≤ − ((1 + n2)n2)
2
4(1 + n2)n2
+
q2
n2 + 1
+
n22
n2 + 1
+
2q · n2
n2 + 1
+
(n+ n2)(2n− n2 + 1)n2
n2 + 1
≤ − ((1 + n2)n2)
2
4(1 + n2)n2
+
n2
n2 + 1
+ n2 + 2n+ (n+ n2)(2n− n2 + 1)
Consider (n + n2)(2n − n2 + 1). The derivative with
respect to n2 is 1 +n−2n2. As the graph of the equation
is concave down, when the derivative is 0, it reaches its
maximum. Thus the maximum occurs when n2 =
n+1
2 ,
which leads to the maximum (3n+1)
2
4 .
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Then it follows that,
z2 ≤ − (1 + n2)n2
4
+
n2
2
+ n+ 2n+
(3n+ 1)2
4
= −1
2
+
n2
2
+ 3n+
9n2
4
+
6n
4
+
1
4
=
11n2
4
+
9n
2
− 1
4
The rest of the terms, by Lemma A.4, are bounded by
n2 − 2n. It follows that
|h′ − h| ≤ 12
n(n+ 1)
(4n2 − 4n+ 1
2
+
11n2
4
+
9n
2
− 1
4
+ n2 + 2n
)
=
12
n(n+ 1)
(23n2
4
+
9n
2
+
1
4
)
≤ 69
Case 2b: n1 = 1, n2 > 0
|h′ − h| =
∣∣∣∣ 12n(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
n′ir¯′
2
i − 3(n+ 1)
− 12
n(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
nir¯
2
i + 3(n+ 1)
∣∣∣∣
=
12
n(n+ 1)
∣∣∣∣ g∑
i=1
n′ir¯′
2
i −
g∑
i=1
nir¯
2
i
∣∣∣∣
=
12
n(n+ 1)
∣∣∣∣(n1 − 1)r¯′21 − n1r¯21 + (n2 + 1)r¯′22 − n2r¯22
+
g∑
i=3
ni(r¯′
2
i − r¯2i )
∣∣∣∣
≤ 12
n(n+ 1)
(
| − p2|+ |(n2 + 1)r¯′22 − n2r¯22|+ n2 + 2n
)
≤ 12
n(n+ 1)
(
|(n2 + 1)r¯′22 − n2r¯22|+ 2n2 + 2n
)
Now consider the term |(n2 + 1)r¯′22 − n2r¯22|,
|(n2 + 1)r¯′22 − n2r¯22| =
∣∣∣ 1
n2 + 1
( n2∑
j=1
r2j + q ± a2
)2
− 1
n2
( n2∑
j=1
r2j
)2∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣−
(∑n2
j=1 r2j
)2
n2(n2 + 1)
∣∣∣∣+ (q ± a2)2n2 + 1
+
2|q ± a2|
∑n2
j=1 r2j
n2 + 1
≤ (2n− n2 + 1)
2n22
4n2(n2 + 1)
+
(q + a2)
2
n2 + 1
+
2(q + a2)
n2 + 1
· (2n− n2 + 1)n2
2
≤ n2 + (n+ n2)
2
n2 + 1
+ (2n− n2 + 1)(n+ n2)
= n2 +
n2
n2 + 1
+
n2
n2 + 1
+
2n · n2
n2 + 1
+ 2n2 + nn2 − n22 + n2 + n
≤ n2 + n
2
2
+ 1 + 2n+ 2n2 + n2 + 2n
≤ 9
2
n2 + 4n+ 1
It follows that
|h′ − h| ≤ 12
n(n+ 1)
(
9
2
n2 + 4n+ 1 + (2n2 + 2n)
)
=
12
n(n+ 1)
(
13
2
n2 + 6n+ 1
)
≤ 12
n(n+ 1)
(
13
2
n(n+ 1)− n
2
+
n
2
)
≤ 78
Case 2c: n2 = 0, n1 > 1
|h′ − h| =
∣∣∣∣ 12n(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
n′ir¯′
2
i − 3(n+ 1)− 12
n(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
nir¯
2
i + 3(n+ 1)
∣∣∣∣
=
12
n(n+ 1)
∣∣∣∣ g∑
i=1
n′ir¯′
2
i −
g∑
i=1
nir¯
2
i
∣∣∣∣
=
12
n(n+ 1)
∣∣∣∣(n1 − 1)r¯′21 − n1r¯21 + (n2 + 1)r¯′22 − n2r¯22
+
g∑
i=3
ni(r¯′
2
i − r¯2i )
∣∣∣∣
≤ 12
n(n+ 1)
(
|(n1 − 1)r¯′21 − n1r¯21|+ q2 +
g∑
i=3
ni(r¯′
2
i − r¯2i )
)
≤ 12
n(n+ 1)
(
|(n1 − 1)r¯′21 − n1r¯21|+ (n2 + 2n+ n2)
)
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Now consider the term |(n1 − 1)r¯′21 − n1r¯21|,
|(n1−1)r¯′21 − n1r¯21|
=
∣∣∣ 1
n1 − 1
( n1∑
j=1
r1j − p± a1
)2
− 1
n1
( n1∑
j=1
r1j
)2∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣
(∑n1
j=1 r1j
)2
n1(n1 − 1) +
(−p± a1)2
n1 − 1
+
2(−p± a1)
∑n1
j=1 r1j
n1 − 1
∣∣∣∣
note that −p± a1 is always negative. If the sign is −,
then this directly follows. If the sign is +, then p > q,
which indicates p > a1 and thus it again follows that the
term is negative.
Then if the whole inside expression is negative,
|(n1 − 1)r¯′21 − n1r¯21| ≤
2(p± a1)
∑n1
j=1 r1j
n1 − 1
≤
2(−p+ a1)
∑n1
j=1 r1j
n1 − 1
≤ (n+ n1)(2n− n1 + 1)n1
n1 − 1
≤ 2(n+ n1)(2n− n1 + 1)
≤ 2 · (3n+ 1)
2
4
≤ 9n
2
2
+ 3n+
1
2
Then if the whole inside expression is positive,
|(n1 − 1)r¯′21 − n1r¯21| ≤
(∑n1
j=1 r1j
)2
n1(n1 − 1) +
(−p± a1)2
n1 − 1
≤ n1
n1 − 1 ·
(2n− n1 + 1)2
4
+
(n+ n1)
2
n1 − 1
≤ 2n2 + n
2
n1 − 1 +
2nn1
n1 − 1 +
n21
n1 − 1
≤ 2n2 + n2 + 4n+ 2n
≤ 3n2 + 6n
As n ≥ 2, then 3n22 − 3n + 12 ≥ 0. It follows that
9n2
2 + 3n+
1
2 ≥ 3n2 + 6, and thus
|(n1 − 1)r¯′21 − n1r¯21| ≤ 9n
2
2
+ 3n+
1
2
.
Therefore,
|h′ − h| ≤ 12
n(n+ 1)
(
9n2
2
+ 3n+
1
2
+ (n2 + 2n+ n2)
)
≤ 12
n(n+ 1)
(
13n2
2
+ 5n+
1
2
)
≤ 12
n(n+ 1)
(
13n(n+ 1)
2
− 3n
2
+ n
)
≤ 78
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Theorem. Algorithm K˜Wstat is -differentially private.
Proof. There are two sources of randomness inside Al-
gorithm K˜Wstat: the random breaking of ties and
the Laplace noise. So let us write K˜Wstat(x) :=
K˜Wstat(x; r1, r2), where r1 indicates the randomness of
breaking ties and r2 indicates the randomness of the
Laplace noise.
For an arbitrary choice of r∗1 , let K˜W
r∗1
stat(x; r2), be the
function obtained by fixing r1 = r
∗
1 in K˜Wstat. K˜W
r∗1
stat
is simply a Laplace mechanism, so -differential privacy
follows by Theorems 3.1 and 2.8.
Now K˜Wstat is simply randomly outputting one of a
large (but finite) set of possible -differentially private
outputs. Doing so is always private, so K˜Wstat is private.
A.3 Simplification of habs
Changing the squares to absolute values in the Kruskal-
Wallis yields the formula:
habs = (n− 1)
∑g
i=1 ni|r¯i − r¯|∑g
i=1
∑ni
j=1 |rij − r¯|
(1)
When there are no tied rows in the data, this formula
can be simplified a bit. The simplification depends on
whether n is even or odd.
When n is even:
g∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
|rij − r¯| =
(n+ 1
2
− 1
)
+
(n+ 1
2
− 2
)
+ . . .+
(n+ 1
2
− n
2
)
+
(
− n+ 1
2
+
n
2
+ 1
)
+
(
− n+ 1
2
+
n
2
+ 2
)
+ . . .
+
(
− n+ 1
2
+
n
2
+
n
2
)
= −1− 2− . . .− n
2
+
(n
2
+ 1
)
+
(n
2
+ 2
)
+ . . .
+
(n
2
+
n
2
)
=
n
2
· n
2
=
n2
4
Thus, the simplified form of habs for even n is:
habs =
4(n− 1)
n2
g∑
i=1
ni|r¯i − r¯| (2)
When n is odd
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g∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
|rij − r¯| =
(n+ 1
2
− 1
)
+ . . .+
(n+ 1
2
− (n+ 1
2
− 1)
)
+
(n+ 1
2
− n+ 1
2
)
+
((n+ 1
2
+ 1
)
− n+ 1
2
)
+ . . .+
(
n− n+ 1
2
)
=
(n− 1
2
)
+ . . .+ 1 + 0 + 1 + . . .+
(n− 1
2
)
= 2 ·
(
1 + 2 + . . .+
(n− 1
2
))
=
n− 1
2
· n+ 1
2
Thus, the simplified form of habs for odd n is:
habs =
4
n+ 1
g∑
i=1
ni|r¯i − r¯| (3)
As 4n+1 ≥ 4(n−1)n2 , we will use h˜ = h˜O =
4
n+1
∑g
i=1 ni|r¯i − r¯| for sensitivity analysis.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Proof. Here we bound the sensitivity of our KWabsstat
test statistic.
Theorem. The sensitivity of KWabsstat is bounded by
8.
As 4n+1 ≥ 4(n−1)n2 for n > 0, we will use
habs =
4
n+1
∑g
i=1 ni|r¯i − r¯| for sensitivity analysis. As in
the proof of Theorem 3.1, the proof proceeds in cases.
Again, we consider neighboring databases x, x′ that dif-
fer by a change in one row, and our cases are differenti-
ated by whether or not the group of that row changes.
Case 1: Changing row retains group
Consider a “movement” of a row from row p to row q.
Assume p ≤ q (the other case is symmetric).
∆habs =
4
n+ 1
∣∣∣∣∣
g∑
i=1
ni
(∣∣∣∣r¯′i − n+ 12
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣r¯i − n+ 12
∣∣∣∣)
∣∣∣∣∣
Then we can analyze the expression inside the outer
absolute value.
When i = 1,
n1
(∣∣∣r¯′1−n+ 12 ∣∣∣− ∣∣∣r¯1 − n+ 12 ∣∣∣
)
= n1
(∣∣∣n1r¯1 − p+ q − a1
n1
− n+ 1
2
∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣r¯i − n+ 1
2
∣∣∣)
= n1
(∣∣∣r¯1 + −p+ q − a1
n1
− n+ 1
2
∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣r¯i − n+ 1
2
∣∣∣)
≤ n1
∣∣∣−p+ q − a1
n1
∣∣∣
= q − p− a1
When i 6= 1,
ni
(∣∣∣r¯′i − n+ 12 ∣∣∣− ∣∣∣r¯i − n+ 12 ∣∣∣
)
= ni
(∣∣∣nir¯i − ai
ni
− n+ 1
2
∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣r¯i − n+ 1
2
∣∣∣)
≤ ai
ni
· ni
= ai
It follows that,
∆habs =
4
n+ 1
(
q − p− a1 +
g∑
i=2
ai
)
=
4
n+ 1
(
q − p− 2a1 + (q − p)
)
≤ 8
n+ 1
· (n− 1)
≤ 8− 16
n+ 1
Case 2: Changing row changes group
Consider a “movement” of a row from row p to row
q, where, without loss of generality, its group changes
from group 1 to group 2. As before, we must consider
three cases:
Case 2a: n1 > 1, n2 > 0
∆habs =
4
n+ 1
∣∣∣∣ g∑
i=1
(
n′i
∣∣∣r¯′i − n+ 12 ∣∣∣− ni∣∣∣r¯i − n+ 12 ∣∣∣
)∣∣∣∣
For i = 1,
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n′1
∣∣∣r¯′1−n+ 12 ∣∣∣− n1∣∣∣r¯1 − n+ 12 ∣∣∣
= (n1 − 1)
∣∣∣n1r¯1 − p− a1
n1 − 1 −
n+ 1
2
∣∣∣
− n1
∣∣∣n1r¯1
n1
− n+ 1
2
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣n1r¯1 − p− a1 − (n+ 1)(n1 − 1)
2
∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣n1r¯1 − n1(n+ 1)
2
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣n1r¯1 − (n+ 1)n1
2
− p− a1 + n+ 1
2
∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣n1r¯1 − n1(n+ 1)
2
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣n1r¯1 − (n+ 1)n1
2
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣− p− a1 + n+ 1
2
∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣n1r¯1 − n1(n+ 1)
2
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣− p− a1 + n+ 1
2
∣∣∣
For i = 2,
n′2
∣∣∣r¯′2 − n+ 12 ∣∣∣−n2∣∣∣r¯2 − n+ 12 ∣∣∣
= (n2 + 1)
∣∣∣n2r¯2 + q − a2
n2 + 1
− n+ 1
2
∣∣∣
− n2
∣∣∣n2r¯2
n2
− n+ 1
2
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣n2r¯2 + q − a2 − (n2 + 1)(n+ 1)
2
∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣n2r¯2 − n2(n+ 1)
2
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣n2r¯2 − n2(n+ 1)
2
+ q − a2 − n+ 1
2
∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣n2r¯2 − n2(n+ 1)
2
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣n2r¯2 − n2(n+ 1)
2
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣q − a2 − n+ 1
2
∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣n2r¯2 − n2(n+ 1)
2
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣q − a2 − n+ 1
2
∣∣∣
For i > 2,
ni
(∣∣∣r¯′i − n+ 12 ∣∣∣− ∣∣∣r¯i − n+ 12 ∣∣∣
)
= ni
(∣∣∣nir¯i − ai
ni
− n+ 1
2
∣∣∣− ∣∣∣r¯i − n+ 1
2
∣∣∣)
≤ ai
ni
· ni
= ai
Thus, we can bound the sensitivity by:
∆habs ≤ 4n+ 1
( ∣∣∣− p− a1 + n+ 1
2
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣q − a2 − n+ 1
2
∣∣∣+ g∑
i=3
ai
)
≤ 4
n+ 1
( ∣∣∣− p+ n+ 1
2
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣q − n+ 1
2
∣∣∣+ g∑
i=1
ai
)
≤ 4
n+ 1
( ∣∣∣− p+ n+ 1
2
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣q − n+ 1
2
∣∣∣+ q − p )
<
4
n+ 1
(
n+ 1
2
+
n+ 1
2
+ q − p
)
≤ 4
n+ 1
· 2n
≤ 8
Case 2b: n1 = 1, n2 > 0
As before,
∆habs =
4
n+ 1
∣∣∣∣ g∑
i=1
(
n′i
∣∣∣r¯′i − n+ 12 ∣∣∣− ni∣∣∣r¯i − n+ 12 ∣∣∣
)∣∣∣∣
For i = 1,
n′1
∣∣∣r¯′1 − n+ 12 ∣∣∣− n1∣∣∣r¯1 − n+ 12 ∣∣∣ = 0− 1 · ∣∣∣p− n+ 12 ∣∣∣
≤ −n− 1
2
The i 6= 1 cases are as in case I. Thus,
∆habs =
4
n+ 1
∣∣∣∣− n− 12 + ∣∣∣q ± a2 − n+ 12 ∣∣∣+
g∑
i=3
ai
∣∣∣∣
≤ 4
n+ 1
(∣∣∣− n− 1
2
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣q − n+ 1
2
∣∣∣+ g∑
i=2
ai
)
≤ 4
n+ 1
(
n− 1
2
+
n− 1
2
+ n
)
≤ 4
n+ 1
(n− 1 + n)
≤ 8
Case 2c: n2 = 0, n1 > 1
As before,
∆habs =
4
n+ 1
∣∣∣∣ g∑
i=1
(
n′i
∣∣∣r¯′i − n+ 12 ∣∣∣− ni∣∣∣r¯i − n+ 12 ∣∣∣
)∣∣∣∣
For i = 2,
n′2
∣∣∣r¯′2 − n+ 12 ∣∣∣− n2∣∣∣r¯2 − n+ 12 ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣q − n+ 12 ∣∣∣ ≤ n− 12 .
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For i 6= 2, it is the same as in case II. Thus,
∆habs =
4
n+ 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣− p± a1 + n+ 12 ∣∣∣+ n− 12 +
g∑
i=3
ai
∣∣∣∣
≤ 4
n+ 1
(∣∣∣− p+ n+ 1
2
∣∣∣+ n− 1
2
+
g∑
i=2
ai
)
≤ 4
n+ 1
(
n− 1
2
+
n− 1
2
+ n
)
≤ 4
n+ 1
(
n− 1 + n)
≤ 8
A.5 Type I Error Rate of K˜Wabsstat
When we compute the reference distribution for habs in
the public setting, we require the size of each group to be
known. In the private setting, however, the group sizes
are not public and therefore cannot be used in the ref-
erence distribution. Thus, we must determine the worst
case group sizes and use these to compute the reference
distribution in Algorithm K˜Wp.
Theorem A.5. Let Habs be the random variable of
which habs is an instance. Then the expected value of
Habs is maximized when the sizes of the groups are n/g.
Proof. Let R¯i be the random variable of which r¯i is an
instance. The distribution of R¯i is known to be R¯i ∼
N
(
µ = n+12 , σ
2 = n
2−1
12ni
)
. Let Zi be a standard normal
random variable: Zi ∼ N
(
µ = 0, σ2 = 1
)
. We can relate
R¯i and Zi by
R¯i =
√
n2 − 1
12ni
Zi +
n+ 1
2
.
Additionally, it is known that a half normal distribu-
tion from a standard normal, |Zi|, has mean
√
2
pi and
variance 1− 2pi .
We will use the formulation of Habs when n is odd.
The algebra is identical for an even n.
Habs =
4
n+ 1
g∑
i=1
ni
∣∣∣∣R¯i − n+ 12
∣∣∣∣
=
4
n+ 1
g∑
i=1
ni
∣∣∣∣∣∣
√
n2 − 1
12ni
Zi +
n+ 1
2
− n+ 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
√
4(n− 1)
3(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
√
ni |Zi|
Let us consider the expected value of Habs:
E(Habs) = E
(√
4(n− 1)
3(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
√
ni |Zi|
)
=
√
4(n− 1)
3(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
√
ni E(|Zi|)
=
√
4(n− 1)
3(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
√
ni E(|Zi|)
=
√
4(n− 1)
3(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
√
ni ·
√
2
pi
=
√
8(n− 1)
3pi(n+ 1)
g∑
i=1
√
ni
The expected value of Habs is maximized when∑g
i=1
√
ni is maximized. This will occur when the sizes
of each of the groups are n/g.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Recall that
MWstat = U = min{U1,U2},
where
U1 = r1 − n1(n1 + 1)
2
and U2 = r2 − n2(n2 + 1)
2
.
We now prove the following:
Theorem (Sensitivity of MWstat). The local sensitivity
is given by LSMWstat(x) = max{n1, n2}, where n1 and n2
are the sizes of the two groups in x.
Proof. We bound the sensitivity of U1 and U2, and note
that this bound also applies to their minimum. We con-
sider two cases, one where the row that differs between x
and x′ retains its group and where it changes its group.
“Changing” row retains group
Consider two databases x and x′ that differ only in
row j and where row j is in the same group in both x
and x′. Without loss of generality, suppose j is in group
1 and that v′j > vj (where vj and v
′
j are the values of
row j in x and x′ respectively). Suppose that the row
was originally (in x) part of a tie in ranks with b other
rows and it becomes part of a tie in ranks with d other
rows (in x′). Let the number of rows between these two
groups of ties be c and let the number of rows before the
first tie be a and the number of rows after the second tie
be e. This setup is shown in Figure 14.
The rank of vj in x is
a+1+a+b
2 and the rank of v
′
j
in x′ is a+b+c+a+b+c+d2 . Note that when an element is
removed from a tie, the rank of every element in the tie
will change by 12 .
Let b1 and b2 be the number of the b elements (i.e.,
those tied with row j) in database x that are in groups
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Figure 14: x and x′ differ only in that vj is “changed”
such that its rank is “moved” from region b to region d.
1 and 2, respectively. Let c1, c2, d1, and d2 be similiarly
defined for the regions of c and d elements.
We find that the sensitivity, LSU1 , is the sum of five
effects. The first is the removal of the row in x, which
decreases the sum by a+1+a+b2 . The second is the ad-
dition of the row in x′, which increases the sum by
a+b+c+a+b+c+d
2 . The third is the effect on the rank of
the b − 1 tied elements (excluding row j itself), which
causes the sum to decrease by b1−12 . The fourth is the
effect on the d tied elements, which causes the sum to
decrease by d12 . The fifth is decrease in rank for the c el-
ements that are now below instead of above row j, which
causes the sum to decrease by c1.
LSU1 =
∣∣∣∣− a+ 1 + a+ b2 + a+ b+ c+ a+ b+ c+ d2
− b1 − 1
2
− d1
2
− c1
∣∣∣∣
=
(b− b1) + (2c− 2c1) + (d− d1)
2
=
b2
2
+ c2 +
d2
2
≤ n2
Similarly, considering how ranks of group 2 elements
get changed, we get
LSU2 =
∣∣∣∣− b22 − c2 − d22
∣∣∣∣
≤ n2
The proof is identical for the movement of a row in
group 2 and yields a bound of n1.
”Changing” row switches groups
Now let us consider x and x′ such that one row is
moved to a new group. Without loss of generality, we
assume the row moves from group 1 to group 2. We also
assume as before that v′j > vj and we define a, b, c, d and
e as before.
For U1, the removal of the element itself from group 1
first causes the rank sum to decrease by a+1+a+b2 . The
decrease in n1 causes the second term of U1 change from
n1(n1+1)
2 to
(n1−1)n1
2 , which leads to the contribution to
LSU1 to be − (n1−1)n12 + n1(n1+1)2 . The rest of the effects
on U1 is the same as in the previous part. Thus,
LSU1 =
∣∣∣∣− a+ 1 + a+ b2 − (n1 − 1)n12 + n1(n1 + 1)2
− b1 − 1
2
− d1
2
− c1
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣−2a+ b+ 12 + n1 − b1 − 12 − d12 − c1
∣∣∣∣
If the expression inside the absolute value is positive,
it follows that
LSU1 = n1 −
2a+ b+ 1
2
− b1 − 1
2
− d1
2
− c1
≤ n1
If the expression inside the absolute value is negative,
it follows that
LSU1 =
2a+ b+ 1
2
+
b1 − 1
2
+
d1
2
+ c1 − n1
≤ 2a+ b+ b+ d+ 2c
2
− n1
≤ a+ b+ c+ d− n1
≤ n1 + n2 − n1
= n2
Then similarly for U2,
LSU2 =
∣∣∣∣a+ b+ c+ a+ b+ c+ d2 − (n2 + 2)n22 + n2(n2 + 1)2
− b2 − 1
2
− d2
2
− c2
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣2a+ 2b+ 2c+ d2 − n2 − 1− b2 − 12 − d22 − c2
∣∣∣∣
If the expression inside the absolute value is positive,
it follows that
LSU2 =
2a+ 2b+ 2c+ d
2
− n2 − 1− b2 − 1
2
− d2
2
− d2
≤ 2(n1 + n2)
2
− n2
≤ n1
If the expression inside the absolute value is positive,
it follows that
LSU2 = n2 + 1 +
b2 − 1
2
+
d2
2
+ c2 − 2a+ 2b+ 2c+ d
2
≤ n2 + 1 + b− 1
2
+
d
2
+ c− 2a+ 2b+ 2c+ d
2
= n2 + 1− 2a+ b+ c+ 1
2
≤ n2 + 1− 1
≤ n2
The proof is identical for the movement of a row in
group 2 and yields a bound of the opposite row’s group
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size in each case. The proof is symmetric for the move-
ment to a lower row and yields the same bound as the
movement to a higher row case.
Thus, the overall sensitivity is bounded by
LSU = max{n1, n2}
A.7 Privacy of M˜Wstat
Theorem A.6. M˜Wstat(x) is (m + U , δ)-differentially
private.
Proof. We first divide M˜Wstat into two steps. First a
function f outputs m˜. Then, for a given value of m˜, a
function g outputs U˜ . We let gw be the function g when
we have fixed m˜ = w. We consider an arbitrary output
set S ∈ R2 and let B be the set of outputs where n−m∗
was not a correct bound on the local sensitivity of U .
That is, B = {(w, z) | w > m+ c}.
First we show that output in B (i.e., a bad bound for
m) occurs only with probability δ.
Lemma A.7. Pr[M˜Wstat(x) ∈ B] ≤ δ .
Proof. First, recall that by definition M˜Wstat(x) ∈ B ex-
actly when f(x) > m + c. All that remains is a simple
calculation using the cumulative density function of the
Laplace distribution.
Let F (t) be the cumulative density function of the
Laplace distribution. Then,
Pr
[
(M(x),NM(x)(x)) ∈ B] = Pr[ |m˜−m| > c]
= Pr
[
|m˜−m| > − ln(2δ)
m
]
= Pr
[ ∣∣∣Lap( 1
m
)∣∣∣ > − ln(2δ)
m
]
= 1− F
(
ln(2δ)
m
)
= 1−
(
1− 1
2
e
ln(2δ)
m
·m
)
=
1
2
eln(2δ)
= δ
As a result of Lemma A.7, we can restrict ourselves
to S \ B. Conditioned on the output being in S \ B, we
know that the noise added to U is sufficient to maintain
privacy. Below we write Pr[f(x) = w] to denote the prob-
ability density function of f(x) at w (and analogously for
g).
Pr[M˜Wstat(x) ∈ S] ≤ Pr[M˜Wstat(x) ∈ S \ B] + Pr[M˜Wstat(x) ∈ B]
= Pr[M˜Wstat(x) ∈ S \ B] + δ
=
∫
S\B
Pr[f(x) = w] · Pr[gw(x) = z] dw dz + δ
≤
∫
S\B
em Pr[f(x′) = w]
· eU Pr[gw(x′) = z] dw dz + δ (4)
= em+U Pr[M˜Wstat(x
′) ∈ S \ B] + δ
≤ em+U Pr[M˜Wstat(x′) ∈ S] + δ
Equation 4 isn’t technically an application of Theorem
2.8, but it follows from an almost identical argument.
(The values of f and gw before the addition of Laplace
noise differ by a bounded amount and the noise added is
scaled so that the bound on the ratio follows immediately
from the formula for the Laplace distribution.)
A.8 Normal approximation for M˜Wp
Here we prove the acceptability of a normal approxima-
tion that increases the efficiency of computing the refer-
ence distribution for M˜Wp.
Theorem A.8. Using Normal(m
∗(n−m∗)
2 ,
m∗(n−m∗)(n+1)
12 )+
Lap
(
n−m∗
U
)
to generate samples Uk from the reference
distribution will only make the type I error smaller
compared to a full simulation.
Proof. There are two parts that need to be proved in
order to prove the theorem, and we consider them sepa-
rately.
Initially, we need to show that it is acceptable for the
reference distribution to be computed based on the as-
sumption that there are no ties in the database.
When n becomes very large, U approximately fol-
lows a normal distribution with µU =
n1n2
2 and σU =√
n1n2
12
(
(n+ 1)−∑ki=1 t3i−tin(n−1)), where n1 and n2 are the
group sizes, k is the number of distinct ranks that are
tied, and ti is the number of rows sharing rank i [21].
However, in the private setting, both k and ti are pri-
vate information and cannot be used to generate the null
distribution. Since the standard deviation when there
are no ties, σ′U =
√
n1n2
12 (n+ 1), is greater than σU ,
Pr[Z < z′∗] < Pr[Z < z∗] = Pr[Z < z′∗],
where Z, Z′ are normal random variables when there are
ties and no ties, respectively, z∗, z′∗ are critical values
for the distributions of Z and Z′, respectively.
Thus, according to the relation above, we can use the
normal approximation as if there were no ties in the null
distribution.
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The second part is that, when we generate the null
distribution, we need m to be used for the normal dis-
tribution. However, in the differential privacy setting, m
indicates one of the group sizes and is private informa-
tion, so it cannot be used directly to generate the private
null distribution. Instead, we use m∗ to replace m, but
we need to ensure that this substitution does not increase
the type I error rate.
By previous discussion, we know that with
1 − δ probability, m∗ ≤ m. Then compare
Norm(m
∗(n−m∗)
2 ,
m∗(n−m∗)(n+1)
12 ) and
Norm(m(n−m)2 ,
m(n−m)(n+1)
12 ). As m
∗(n−m∗) < m(n−m),
Norm(m
∗(n−m∗)
2 ,
m∗(n−m∗)(n+1)
12 ) has smaller expected
value and smaller variance, and therefore it has smaller
critical values.
Thus,
Pr[Z < z∗∗] < Pr[Z < z∗∗] = Pr[Z∗ < z∗∗] = α,
where Z, Z∗ are random variables of the Normal Laplace
distribution generated by m and m∗, respectively, and
z∗∗ is the critical value for the distribution Z∗, respec-
tively.
Therefore, it is acceptable to use m∗ to generate the
reference distribution (with 1− δ probability).
In conclusion, we can generate the reference distribu-
tion using
Normal(
m∗(n−m∗)
2
,
m∗(n−m∗)(n+ 1)
12
) + Lap
(n−m∗
U
)
.
Doing so causes the type I error rate to decrease, which
is acceptable, even if it means a decrease in power.
A.9 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Theorem. Algorithm W˜Pstat is -differentially private.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that the sensitivity of
WPstat is bounded by 2n. The privacy of the algorithm
then follows directly from Theorem 2.8.
Figure 15: x and x′ differ only in that dj is ”moved”
from region A2 to region A4.
Let x and x′ be neighbouring databases. Let row j
be the row that differs between x and x′. Let dj and d′j
indicate the difference between the data values in row j
in x and x′, respectively. Similarly, let rj and r′j indicate
the rank of row j in x and x′. We assume without loss
of generality that d′j > dj .
We divide the rows of x (or x′) into five regions, A1
through A5. A1 is the set of rows i with di < dj . A2 is
the set with di = dj . A3 has di values between dj and d
′
j .
A4 has di values equal to d
′
j . A5 has values greater than
d′j (though we don’t need to use A5 in the proof). For
convenience, we use ai to represent the size of the set Ai
in x.
As shown in Figure 15, x and x′ differ only in that
dj is “moved” from region A2 to region A4. Let w and
w′ be test statistics produced from databases x and x′,
respectively.
Recall that w =
∑
i siri. Let wi = siri be the contri-
bution of row i to this sum. We then want to bound
∆w = |w − w′|. We similarly set ∆wi to be |siri − s′ir′i|.
Note that for i in A1 or A5 we have ∆wi = 0.
Next, we consider ∆wj the change in the term cor-
responding to the row where the data changes. As
row j is tied with all other rows in region A2, rj =
(a1+1)+(a1+a2)
2 =
2a1+a2+1
2 and
r′j =
(a1+a2+a3)+(a1+a2+a3+a4)
2 =
2a1+2a2+2a3+a4
2 . In the
worst case, sj changes when the move occurs, so
∆wj < rj + r
′
j =
2a1 + a2 + 1
2
+
2a1 + 2a2 + 2a3 + a4
2
=
4a1 + 3a2 + 2a3 + a4 + 1
2
.
Now we consider ∆wi where i ∈ A2 (excluding row
j). As there is one fewer row tied, each of their ranks
(excluding row j) is changed from 2a1+a2+12 to
2a1+a2
2 ,
which means that each row is changed by 12 . As there
are a2 − 1 rows in this region, the contribution to ∆w
from this set of rows is bounded by a2−12 .
Similarly, each of the row ranks (excluding row
j) in region A4 is changed from
2a1+2a2+2a3+a4+1
2 to
2a1+2a2+2a3+a4
2 as one more row is tied with rows in A4.
As there are a4 rows, ∆w from the rows in region A4 is
bounded by a42 .
Now we consider region A3. As dj has moved from
before this region to after this region, each of the row
ranks is changed by 1. Therefore the contribution to ∆w
from the rows in region A3 is bounded by a3.
It follows that
∆w = |w − w′|
≤ 4a1 + 3a2 + 2a3 + a4 + 1
2
+
a2 − 1
2
+
a4
2
+ a3
= 2a1 + 2a2 + 2a3 + a4
≤ 2(a1 + a2 + a3 + a4)
≤ 2n
Having bounded the sensitivity, the proof is complete.
A.10 Proof of Theorems 5.3 and Theo-
rem 5.4
Theorem. The sensitivity of x¯ is 2n .
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Proof. Consider two neighboring databases, D and D′,
of size n. Without loss of generality suppose that the
observation that differs is xn. Then,
∆x¯ =
∣∣x¯′ − x¯∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣x1 + . . .+ x′nn − x1 + . . .+ xnn
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣x′n − xnn
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2
n
Theorem. The sensitivity of s2 is 5n−1 .
Proof. Consider two neighboring databases, D and D′,
of size n. Without loss of generality suppose that the
observation that differs is xn. We first simplify s2 for
sensitivity analysis.
s2 =
1
n− 1
n∑
k=1
(xk − x¯)2
=
1
n− 1
(
n∑
k=1
x2k − 2x¯
n∑
k=1
xk +
n∑
k=1
x¯2
)
=
1
n− 1
(
n∑
k=1
x2k − 2nx¯2 + nx¯2
)
=
1
n− 1
(
n∑
k=1
x2k − nx¯2
)
Then we consider how much s2 is differed with one row
xn differed.
∆s2 =
∣∣∣(s2)′ − s2∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n− 1
[
n∑
i=1
(x′i)
2 − n(x¯′)2
]
− 1
n− 1
[
n∑
i=1
x2i − nx¯2
]∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
n− 1
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
(x′i)
2 −
n∑
i=1
x2i − n(x¯′)2 + nx¯2
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
n− 1
∣∣∣(x′n)2 − (xn)2 + n(x¯2 − (x¯′)2)∣∣∣
By the triangle inequality,
∆s2 ≤ 1
n− 1
(∣∣∣(x′n)2 − (xn)2∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣n(x¯2 − (x¯′)2)∣∣∣)
≤ 1
n− 1
(
1 + n|x¯+ x¯′||x¯− x¯′|)
By Theorem 5.3, |x¯− x¯′| ≤ 2n . It follows that
∆s2 ≤ 1
n− 1
(
1 + 2|x¯+ x¯′|)
≤ 1
n− 1(1 + 4)
=
5
n− 1
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B Supplementary Results
B.1 Many Groups
Application to Real-World Data The Global
Findex database maintains survey data from a large
number of countries and years about financial inclusion
around the world [41]. We will use our differentially pri-
vate Kruskal Wallis tests to examine whether income
quintiles statistically significantly differ by age in the
United States.
In Figure 16, we sample a large number of subsets
of several different sizes in order to quantify how likely
our differentially private variant of the Kruskal-Wallis
would be to detect the effect in this dataset as compared
to the public version. At an  of 1, the absolute value
test variant follows extremely closely behind the public
version. Even at an  an order of magnitude smaller,
the absolute value test outperforms the standard version.
Because these values are randomly sampled, we can also
learn from this figure that the test is robust to unequal
sample sizes.
Figure 16: Power of K˜Wabsp at various values of  and n
on subsets of the Global Financial Inclusion Data. (g =
5, α = .05, unequal group sizes)
Dealing with ties We now examine the effect of our
tiebreaking procedure (randomly ordering all tied values)
on the power of the test. We subtract the Gini coefficient
[16], a measure of the statistical spread of data, from 1,
in order to quantify the proportion of ties per trial of the
test procedure.
Varying effect size In Figure 18, we examine the use
case of large sample sizes attempting to detect small ef-
fect sizes, as is increasingly common in the scientific lit-
erature [4]. We find that, at large sample sizes, the test
at  = 1 needs only marginally more data than the public
test to achieve the same power.
Uniformity of p-values (cont.) Theorem A.5 shows
that the expected value of the statistic is maximized
Figure 17: Power of K˜Wabsp at various proportions of
tied values and n. (Effect size: max(µn) − min(µn) =
2σ; g = 3;  = 1; α = .05; equal group sizes; normally
distributed sample data)
Figure 18: Power of K˜Wabsp at various effect sizes and
. (n = 900; g = 3; α = .05; equal group sizes; normally
distributed sample data)
when the groups are exactly equal in size. Thus, in place
of the true group sizes, algorithm K˜Wabsp assumes that
the group sizes are of size bng c when simulating the ref-
erence distribution (in order to maintain privacy.) One
may wonder, then, if the type I error rate of our test
increases when sample sizes are unequal. We thus fix
the total sample size and vary the proportion of the to-
tal sample size n that the maximum group sample size n
takes up. The results are shown in Figure 19.
As displayed in Figure 19, the type I error rate of
our test is consistently below alpha. Further, the power
loss due to unequal sample sizes is minimal, even with
drastically different group sample sizes.
Further Comparisons to Previous Work We con-
tinue our comparisons to Swanberg et. al.’s test intro-
duced in Section 3 at varying parameterizations in order
to better understand the relationship between their test
and K˜Wabsp.
Due to the rank-based nature of K˜Wabsp, the public
nonparametric test statistic (before the addition of noise)
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Figure 19: A quantile-quantile plot of K˜Wabsp compar-
ing the distribution of simulated p-values to the uniform
distribution with unequal group sizes. (g = 3;  = 1;
n = 100)
does not change once all of the ranks of one group are on
one side of the distribution. Thus, we take a particular
interest in sampling distributions with an effect size well
beyond two standard deviations (the maximum studied
in the main body) since the parametric statistic ought to
perform better in such situations. We find, however, that
K˜Wabsp persists in outperforming Swanberg et. al.’s test
at the parameterizations chosen to reflect such a setting
in Figure 20.
Figure 20: Power comparison of K˜Wabsp and Swanberg
et. al.’s test at a large effect size with various n. (g = 3;
α = .05;  = .1; effect size: max(µn) − min(µn) = 10σ;
normally distributed sample data)
We also consider settings where effect sizes are notably
smaller than those studied in the main body in Figure
21.
Figure 21: Power comparison of K˜Wabsp and Swanberg
et. al.’s test at a small effect size with various n. (g = 3;
 = 1; effect size: max(µn) − min(µn) = σ3 ; normally
distributed sample data)
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B.2 Two Groups
Application to Real-World Data In 2017, Ander-
sen et al. conducted a study on patient’s and com-
munity health volunteer’s understanding of eligibility
for a legal medical abortion in Nepal [1]. The dataset
collected for the study was released on the condition
that users of the data not seek to deanonymize any of
the study participants. We demonstrate that our test
reaches a meaningful level of statistical power for a vari-
ety of parameters—and could have done so with smaller
sample sizes than that taken in this study—and thus a
differentially-private query interface would have been a
sufficient tool for the release of this data while greatly
decreasing the risk of reidentification.
Of the many variables in this dataset, we focus on
two; the first is simply a categorical variable indicating
whether or not a medical abortion was granted, and the
second is the number of days since the patient’s last pe-
riod. One may wonder if, as the number of days since
the patients last period increases, their likelihood of be-
ing granted a medical abortion changes. This question,
naturally, can be answered by the Mann-Whitney U test.
We have 472 cases where medical abortions were not
granted (with an average number of days since last pe-
riod of around 72), and 2620 cases where medical abor-
tions were granted (with an average number of days since
last period of around 49). The means of the two groups
differ by slightly less than 1.5 standard deviations (where
the number of days since last period is greater for sub-
jects not granted a medical abortion).16
Figure 22: Power of M˜Wp at various values of tot and n.
(Proportion of tot to m = .65; α = .05; m:(n −m) = 1;
effect size µ1 − µ2 ≈ 1.5σ)
In Figure 22 we sample a varying number of observa-
tions from the groups and evaluate the power of both our
and the public test. The far right of the figure shows the
power using almost all of the provided data (while still
maintaining equal group sizes). For  = 1, 100% power
is achieved well before all data is used, while that for 
16These values come from a slightly filtered and tidied ver-
sion of the original dataset—our source code can be found at:
github.com/simonpcouch/non-pm-dpht
= .1 is more likely than not to detect the effect by the
time all of the data is used.
Uniformity of p-values (cont.) In addition to the
examination of uniformity of p-values when group sizes
are equal, we also examine the effect of unequal sample
sizes in Figure 23 and find that as sample sizes become
more unequal, our critical values are increasingly conser-
vative.
Figure 23: A quantile-quantile plot of M˜Wp examining
the effect of unequal group sizes. (tot = 1; proportion of
tot to m = .65; n = 1000; normally distributed sample
data)
While our critical values do not exceed α in any case,
they are much too conservative when total sample size
is too small or group sample sizes are largely different.
Naturally, one might wonder whether we can assume
that group sizes are equal when we generate our refer-
ence distribution, as we do with our Kruskal-Wallis, so
that we can allot of our privacy budget to estimating
the test statistic. In Figure 24, we address this question
with a quantile-quantile plot where we fix total sample
size and use the same reference distribution (assuming
equal group sizes) on null distributions generated with
unequal group sizes. We find that, even with n = 1000
and tot = 1, small differences in group sizes cause egre-
gious increases in the type I error rate. We conclude,
as a result, that our allotment of some portion of the
privacy budget to estimating group sizes is essential.
Varying effect size We examine the power of our test
at varying effect sizes, as shown in Figure 25. Two fea-
tures of this graph display notable characteristics of our
test. Initially, note how minimal the difference is be-
tween the public test and our test at tot = 1; at large
sample sizes (in this case, n = 1500), the power of the
public test and that of our test is almost indistinguish-
able. Further, the tot = .06 line shows that, once the ef-
fect size reaches a difference in µ of roughly 3σ, the power
of the test seems to level off before reaching 1. This is due
to the rank-based nature of the Mann-Whitney; once all
of the ranks of one group are above or below those of the
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Figure 24: A quantile-quantile plot of a modification of
M˜Wp where total sample size is fixed but group sizes vary,
using the same reference distribution (assuming equal
group sizes) for all trials. (tot = 1; proportion of tot to
m = .65; n = 1000; normally distributed sample data)
other, increasing effect size has no consequence. Thus,
at certain choices of tot and n, there is effectively an up-
per bound on the power test that is below 1, regardless
of effect size.
Figure 25: Power of M˜Wp at various effect sizes (µ1−µ2 =
xσ) and privacy parameters . (Proportion of tot to
m = .65; n = 1500; α = .05; m:(n − m) = 1; normally
distributed sample data)
The effect of unequal group sizes In Figure 26, we
quantify the effect of unequal group sizes on the power of
the test. In the public setting, power reduction only oc-
curs when the sample sizes are meaningfully different. In
the private setting, however, when random noise is added
to n1 and n2 for the simulation of the reference distribu-
tion (and thus critical value computation), smaller total
sample sizes often result in substantial differences in size
of m∗ and n−m∗.
Comparative effects of unequal group sizes We
continue the discussion given in Section 4.3 on compar-
ing M˜Wp to K˜Wabsp in the 2-group use case, this time
quantifying the comparative losses in power to the two
tests when group sizes are unequal. The M˜Wp test does
Figure 26: Power of M˜Wp at various values of tot and
sample size m. (Effect size: µ1 − µ2 = 1σ; proportion of
tot to m = .65; α = .05; n = 500; normally distributed
sample data)
not assume equal sizes, and must rather allot some of
the total privacy budget to estimating one of the group
sizes m since the Type I error rate increases when equal
group sizes are assumed when generating the reference
distribution. However, as we have previously shown, it is
acceptable for Type I error for K˜Wabsp to assume equal
group sizes, though this means increases in the Type II
error rate (i.e. losses in power) when group sizes are
highly unequal. Thus, it is natural to ask whether the
M˜Wp test becomes more powerful when group sizes are
very different since some of the privacy budget is allotted
to estimating m, and thus, the reference distribution is
more precisely calibrated to reduce Type II error rate.
Our findings in this setting are summarized in Figures 27
and 28, where we find that K˜Wabsp persists in achieving
higher power than M˜Wp even under such parameteriza-
tions.
Figure 27: Power of M˜Wp and K˜Wabsp at various values
of tot and group sample size m. (Effect size: µ1−µ2 = 1σ;
proportion of tot to m = .65; α = .05; n = 250; g = 2;
normally distributed sample data)
Known group size special case As noted in 4, when
group sizes are known publicly, the entirety of the pri-
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Figure 28: Power of M˜Wp and K˜Wabsp at various values
of tot and group sample size m. (Effect size: µ1−µ2 = 1σ;
proportion of tot to m = .65; α = .05; n = 1000; g = 2;
normally distributed sample data)
vacy budget can be allotted to estimating the test statis-
tic U in the M˜Wp algorithm since m need not be esti-
mated. This special use case increases the precision of
M˜Wp enough to cause the test to reach higher powers
than K˜Wabsp at equivalent parameterizations, as shown
in Figure 29.
Figure 29: Power of M˜Wp and K˜Wabsp at various values
of tot and sample size m. (Effect size: µ1 − µ2 = 1σ;
proportion of tot to m = .65; α = .05; n = 1000; g = 2;
normally distributed sample data)
Allotment of Privacy Budget This section serves
to justify our choice of the optimum proportion of tot to
allot to estimating m and the test statistic MWstat.
Initially, we fix all parameters other than the propor-
tion of  to m and total sample size n and calculate power
across many values.
As shown in Figure 30, to maximize power, the op-
timum proportion of epsilon to allot to estimating m is
near .65.
Figure 30: Power of M˜Wp at various values of proportion
of tot to m and n. (Effect size: µ1 − µ2 = 1σ; tot = 1;
α = .05; m:(n − m) = 1; normally distributed sample
data)
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B.3 Wilcoxon Signed-Rank
Dealing with Ties In Figure 31, 30% of rows have
di = 0 and the other 70% are distributed as before, with
the two data points sampled from normal distributions
with means one standard deviation apart.
Figure 31: Power of W˜Pp at various values of  and n.
(Effect size: µu − µv = 1σ; α = .05; proportion of zeroes
in di is .3; normally distributed sample data)
Figure 10 uses a continuous distribution for the testing
data. To show that our test handles ties more effectively
than the TC test, we again introduce ties into the data,
this time at varying proportion, and measure power. In
particular, Figures 32 and 33 compare our algorithm to
the high utility and high privacy variants of the TC test,
respectively. Here we first choose the number of rows
with di = 0 and then sample the remaining data points
as before. Of course, as the number of rows showing no
difference increases, the power of all tests decreases, but
we see that in all cases our test retains power longer.
Figure 32: Power comparison of the TC [33] High Utility
algorithm and W˜Pp at various proportions of tied values
and n. (Effect size: µu−µv = 1σ;  = 1; α = .05; normally
distributed sample data)
Varying Effect Size We also examine the power of
our test at varying effect sizes. As shown in Figure 34, at
large sample sizes n, in this case 2500, there is essentially
no difference between the minimum effect detectable in
Figure 33: Power comparison of the TC High Privacy
algorithm (k = 15) and W˜Pp at various proportions of
tied values and n. (Effect size: µu − µv = 1σ;  = 1;
α = .05; normally distributed sample data)
the private and public setting. This is because the ran-
dom variation in the sample overwhelms the relatively
small random noise being added for privacy. We also
note, while not shown in the figure, that for small enough
choices of n and  no effect, no matter how large, can be
detected. (Once all di values are positive, increasing the
effect size further has no effect.)
Figure 34: Power of W˜Pp at various values of  and effect
size. (α = .05; n = 2500; normally distributed sample
data)
Application to Real-World Data We now demon-
strate the use of our Wilcoxon algorithm on real-world
data. We use a database of New York City tax ride infor-
mation released in 2014. The database contains informa-
tion on every Yellow Taxi ride in New York City in 2013,
and its release resulted in high-profile de-anonymization
attacks [38]. Our main finding is that (at least for some
natural analyses that we attempt) a differentially pri-
vate query interface would have been sufficient, and the
release of the data set was unnecessary. We also again
compare our statistical power to that of the TC tests and
find it superior.17
17This data set is the same one Task and Clifton originally use
for evaluating their test.
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This dataset contains several variables of interest for
every Yellow Taxi ride in New York City in 2013, of
which the following will be most useful:
• Hack License: a unique identifier for every taxi
driver in the city
• Number of Passengers: how many people rode to-
gether in the taxi
• Trip Time: the duration of the ride in seconds
• Trip Distance: the total distance traveled during the
ride
We subsetted this dataset, initially, to include rides
occuring on January 1st and 2nd of 2013. Then, we only
kept rides given by a driver who drove on both the 1st
and the 2nd. In one data set, ui and vi were the average
trip time on the 1st and 2nd, respectively. The Wilcoxon
test can then be used to test whether trip time varied
between the two days. We calculated two other data sets
similarly for trip distance and number of passengers.
The resulting data sets have 17,066 entries. We sam-
pled (with replacement) 105 different smaller datasets of
size n = 400. Finally, we ran each algorithm on each
of these resulting data sets and report the proportion in
which a significant result (at α = .05) was found. The
results are summarized in Figure 35.
Figure 35: Power of the TC tests, W˜Pp, and the public
test at sample sizes of 400, sampled with replacement
from the NYC taxi data. ( = 1; α = .05)
The power of our test follows the public test closely,
and we see that for a data set as small as 400, we can
achieve results with a private query that are almost as
useful as a full public release of the data. The TC algo-
rithms do not achieve this goal, though the high utility
variant is still meaningfully useful. Of course, there will
be choices of n and  for which the gap between our power
and the power of the public test is quite large, but our
point here is to argue that for even reasonably small data
sets a private query interface can be sufficient for many
important tasks.
Power Comparison at  = .1 We compare the power
of our next algorithm to the previous best at a smaller
choice of .
Figure 36: Power comparison of Task and Clifton’s al-
gorithms, W˜Pp, and the public algorithm at various
database sizes n. (Effect size: µu − µv = 1σ;  = .1;
α = .05; normally distributed sample data)
Critical Value Tables We present critical values for
several choices of  and sample size.
Table 2: Critical Value Comparison for n = 1000
 α Public New TC
1 0.1 1.282 1.296 1.763
0.05 1.645 1.665 2.174
0.025 1.960 1.984 2.594
0.1 0.1 1.282 2.203 5.617
0.05 1.645 2.975 6.028
0.025 1.960 3.740 6.448
0.01 0.1 1.282 17.681 44.157
0.05 1.645 25.234 44.568
0.025 1.960 32.844 44.988
Critical values for n = 1000 and several values of  and α.
To allow easy comparison, these values are for a normal-
ized W statistic, i.e., W has been divided by the relevant
constant so that it is (before the addition of Laplacian
noise) distributed according to a standard normal.
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Table 3: New Critical Value Table for  = 1.0
n 0.05 0.025 0.01 0.005
10 70 83 102 116
20 155 183 220 248
30 256 299 355 397
40 369 429 506 562
50 494 572 670 742
75 854 984 1143 1257
100 1271 1460 1690 1853
200 3402 3895 4486 4900
300 6127 7012 8069 8798
400 9335 10679 12276 13382
500 12978 14845 17061 18592
1000 36235 41443 47637 51906
Critical values at several sample sizes n and two-sided
significance levels α. To calcuate these values, we run 10
million simulations for each parameter combination and
compute the 1 − αth percentile of the absolute value of
the distribution.
Table 4: New Critical Value Table for  = 0.1
n 0.05 0.025 0.01 0.005
10 600 739 922 1061
20 1202 1479 1846 2123
30 1806 2220 2770 3185
40 2413 2968 3704 4261
50 3018 3713 4628 5324
75 4541 5577 6954 7989
100 6073 7461 9294 10677
200 12328 15098 18767 21531
300 18733 22892 28391 32519
400 25296 30837 38193 43736
500 32054 38979 48128 55083
1000 68258 82120 100408 114230
Critical values at several sample sizes n and two-sided
significance levels α. To calcuate these values, we run 10
million simulations for each parameter combination and
compute the 1 − αth percentile of the absolute value of
the distribution.
Table 5: New Critical Value Table for  = 0.01
n 0.05 0.025 0.01 0.005
10 5992 7377 9209 10596
20 11971 14742 18416 21196
30 17976 22137 27644 31774
40 23974 29516 36877 42425
50 29964 36905 46081 53034
75 44933 55371 69105 79513
100 59921 73792 92066 106005
200 119902 147619 184222 212010
300 179942 221477 276678 317895
400 239695 295106 368374 423528
500 299627 368763 460256 529522
1000 600096 738071 921529 1061150
Critical values at several sample sizes n and two-sided
significance levels α. To calcuate these values, we run 10
million simulations for each parameter combination and
compute the 1 − αth percentile of the absolute value of
the distribution.
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B.4 T-Test
Allotment of Privacy Budget This section serves
to briefly justify our choice of the optimum proportion
of the privacy budget to allot to estimating ̂¯x and ŝ2.
Figure 37: Power at various values of proportion of the
total privacy budget allotted to ̂¯x and ŝ2. (Effect size:
µ1 − µ2 = 1σ;  = 1; α = .05
As evidenced in Figure 37, unlike M˜Wp, the optimum
proportion of  to allot to either statistic is not obvious;
certain proportions offer distinct advantages depending
on parameterizations. To most objectively choose our
allotment of the privacy budget, we refer to the common
80% power rule used in determining sample size require-
ments in biological studies and consider the  allotment
that reaches 80% power most quickly to be optimum.
Resultantly, we choose to allot equal proportions of the
total privacy budget to estimating ̂¯x and ŝ2.
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